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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MISDEMEANOR CASES
JOHN M. JUNKER*

The indigent misdemeanant's right to appointed counsel1 has yet
to receive explicit constitutional recognition by the United States Supreme Court. And in the absence of such recognition, a large majority
of the estimated five million persons annually charged with non-traffic
misdemeanors 2 must, if they are financially unable to hire an attorney,3 face the bewildering, stigmatizing and (especially at this
level) assembly-line criminal justice system4 without the assistance of
counsel. The misdemeanor prosecution is the "Appalachia" of the
criminal justice system. At the same time, the misdemeanant's
claim to a share in the general affluence could hardly be stronger.
It draws doctrinal strength from three powerful constitutional sources:
(1) counsel-at-trial cases, like Gideon v. Wainwright,5 (or In re
Gault)' arising under the sixth and fourteenth amendments; (2)
7
counsel-on-appeals cases, like Douglas v. California
arising under
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.A., 1959, Washington
State; J.D., 1962, University of Chicago. Professor Junker is counsel of record for
the defendant in Seattle v. Hendrix, an indigent misdemeanant case now before the
Washington Supreme Court. See note 201, infra. Editor.
I Economy of expression has required that several recurring matters be expressed
in short-hand terms. They should be understood to have the meaning here ascribed
to them. "Indigent" refers not to "a total absence in the accused of all means and
resources," but to "a lack of financial resources adequate to permit the accused to hire
his own lawyer." See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAI's COMMITTEE ON POVERTY
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JusTicE 7 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as ALLEN REPORT, after Professor Francis A. Allen, chairman of the Committee].
"Misdemeanant" refers to persons accused of misdemeanor offenses as herein defined.

See note 170 in ra. "Appointed counsel" is intended to include all modes of providing
lawyers for indigent persons, even though in some jurisdictions such lawyers may
not be formally "appointed" by the court.
21 L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSES OF THE POOR IN THE CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERIcAN
STATE COURTS 123 (1965) [hereinafter cited as 1 SILVERSTEIN] ; Report of the Confer-

ence on Legal Manpower Needs of CrininalLaw, 41 F.R.D. 389, 392 (1966). Since the

"Manpower" conferees apparently relied on Silverstein's estimate of the need, it is not
surprising that both studies agree on the 5,000,000 figure. What is odd is that
Silverstein's 1965 estimate seems to have included traffic cases while his identical
1966 estimate specifically excludes them.
' Silverstein estimates that at least 25% and perhaps as many as 50% of those
charged with misdemeanor offenses are unable to afford an adequate defense. 1
SILVERSTEIN at 125.
' PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTIcE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 29-36 (1967) ; Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law

and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 603 (1956); cf. A. TREBACHr, THE RATIONING oF JusTIcE 63-64 (1964). On the stigma that attaches even to a minor offense,
see Schwartz & Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 SocIAL PROBLEMS 133
(1962).
-372 U.S. 335 (1963).
0
387U.S.1 (1967).
7372 U.S. 353 (1963).
[685]

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

( VOL. 43 : 685

the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment; and (3)
other right-to-counsel cases, like Miranda v. Arizona' in which the
right is derived from the need to protect other specific constitutional
0
guarantees, or like United States v. Wade9 and Gilbert v. California"
in which the right is designed to assure fairness during informal
proceedings.
Moreover, in every relevant sense, the indigent misdemeanant is
indistinguishable from the indigent charged with a felony. Neither is
capable, unaided, of providing the kind of challenge that has traditionally been considered essential to assure both the reliability of the
criminal process and the containment of governmental power." Thus
the relevant analytical task at this juncture is not so much the conventional one of evaluating the factors that bear on the question of
whether misdemeanants, like felons, ought to be entitled to appointed
counsel, but rather to explain why a proposition as doctrinally secure
and humanely appealing as the notion that a person accused of a
misdemeanor "requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him," has thus far failed to produce the apparently inevitable result; why, despite opportunities to confront and
resolve these constitutional issues, the Court has thus far withheld its
writ. Such an analysis yields more than explanation; it also exposes
for consideration the existence and strength of policy elements too
often left unanalyzed. Specifically, this line of inquiry forces one to
deal with the issues of where, on principle, the right-to-counsel line
should be drawn; whether some classes of offenses generally termed
"criminal" may legitimately be excluded; and, if so, how one formulates and justifies a standard embodying such exclusions.
These then are the focal tasks of the present inquiry: first, to
examine the present status of the misdemeanant's right to counsel
under the Constitution; second, to evaluate possible substitutes for
the felony standard; and finally, to attempt to explain the longevity of
the felony standard in the face of powerful doctrinal and social forces
for change. The present status, of the misdemeanant's right to appointed counsel, both in law and in fact, is detailed in the Appendix.
S384 U.S. 436 (1966).

388 U.S. 218 (1967).
'0388 U.S. 263 (1967).
"See ALLEN REPORT 8-11; Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process
Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957); but see Blumberg,
Covert Contingencies in the Right to the Assistance of Counsel, 20 VAND. L. Rv. 581
(1967), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 72-100.
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I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To APPOINTED
COUNSEL IN MISDEMEANOR CASES

A. The Sixth Amendment
Although the dominant trend during the period since Gideon has
been increasingly toward providing counsel for the indigent misdemeanant, in one sense the case for recognition of a sixth amendment
right to counsel in such cases has been on the wane. Since Gideon
involved a felony conviction, conventional analysis would insist that
the Court could not there have held that counsel must be appointed in
misdemeanor cases. Nor, in the ensuing five years, has the Court yet
so held. In this respect, the misdemeanor prosecution must be counted
as something of an exception. For the same period has seen a remarkable expansion of the right to appointed counsel in related criminal proceedings, and the trend shows no signs of abating. 12 The misdemeanant-in many ways the most likely candidate for inclusion in
the right-to-counsel ranks in the immediate post-Gideon era-has been
passed over in favor of the suspected offender,' 3 the indicted suspect
subjected to surreptitious interrogation, 4 the "in-custody" suspect,' 5
the juvenile,' 6 the suspect at an identification line-up 7 and, most recently, the probation revokee.' 8 During this -same period, the Court
has refused to review misdemeanor convictions challenged on rightto-counsel grounds. 9 These post-Gideon developments open up several
analytical avenues. They provide a kind of rhetorical record of the
scope of the right to counsel recognized in Gideon. Viewed more conventionally, they obviously also provide analogical support for extension of the right to counsel to misdemeanor cases. Finally, the postGideon counsel cases suggest an explanation for the Court's refusal
thus far to recognize a right to appointed counsel in misdemeanor
cases. The last two avenues are explored later in this article; 0 the
immediate task is to consider the waning strength of the misdemea' United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) ; Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967) ; Mempa v. Rhay, 88 S. Ct.254 (1967).

"Escobedo,v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
(96)
"Massiah v. United States, 377 478
U.S.201(1964).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

"In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
'United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263 (1967).
' Mempa v. Rhay, 88 S.Ct 254 (1967).
'Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907 (1966); Cortinez v. Flournoy, 385 U.S. 925
(1966); 385 U.S. 982 (1966); cf. Heller v. Connecticut, 88 S. Ct 213 (1967), cert.
denied, (Fortas, J., dissenting).
See text accompanying notes 42-48, 63-71 and 162-68 infra.
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nant's claim to counsel as evidenced by the rhetoric of the postGideon counsel cases.
As suggested, conventional analysis would require that the holding
of the Gideon case be stated with reference to the fact that it involved a felony conviction. At an only slightly higher level of abstraction, however, Gideon could be characterized as involving a conviction of a crime; and it would not, in most contexts, have been an
indefensible position to suggest that any indigent person charged with
a crime was, by virtue of Gideon, entitled to appointed counsel. No
one has suggested, for example, that because the defendant in Mapp
v. Ohio2' was convicted of a felony, 22 the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures was therefore applicable only to state felony prosecutions. 23 No such argument was ad"'367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'The offense was possession of obscene books and pictures, punishable under
Ohio law by not less than one nor more than seven years' imprisonment. The actual
sentence was indeterminate, with no possibility of parole until service of "the
minimum term provided for such felony." State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 166
N.E.2d 387, 388n (1960).
' "There is, so far as I understand constitutional history, no distinction under
the Fourth Amendment between types of crimes .... [T]he Fourth Amendment draws
no lines between various substantive offenses." Katz v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 507,
516 (1967) (concurring opinion).
It may be argued that the suggested analogy between the fourth and sixth amendments is false. The breadth of the protection against illegal searches and seizures,
such an argument would run, is simply an accurate reflection of the breadth of the
rationale for excluding illegally seized evidence. Exclusion has never been justified
as reparation to the victim of an unconstitutional search and seizure; the victim
stands instead as the fortuitous champion of the public's right of privacy. The purpose of the exclusionary rule is "to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty.., by removing the incentive to disregard it." Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). And since privacy is as much invaded in a misdemeanor as in a felony case, the deterrence rationale requires that the exclusionary
rule be "as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to guard." Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892). The rationale of the right-to-counsel is much
narrower, the argument continues, since it is designed not to benefit the public but
to protect the accused's interest in a reliable adjudication of his guilt or innocence.
It follows that the accused's circumstances-such as whether the offense charged is a
felony or a misdemeanor-may properly be considered in determining whether to
recognize his right to appointed counsel.
The argument is vulnerable on several grounds. While it purports to justify the
difference between the scope of the two rights, it fails even to explain that difference.
The deterrence rationale does not of its own force demand complete, or even optimal,
compliance with the fourth amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures.
If it is permissible to argue that reliability may be sacrificed in some cases out of
deference to other goals of the legal system, it is likewise permissible to suggest
that deterrence of unlawful searches and seizures may, in appropriate circumstances,
be subordinated to other pressing demands of the criminal process. Cf. Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 42, 44 n.2 (1967) (Stewart J., concurring). Moreover, the argument fails to explain why other sixth amendment rights which, like the right to
counsel, are designed to assure the reliability of the criminal process, are applicable
in misdemeanor as well as felony proceedings. See text at notes 115-27 infra.
These responses challenge the assertion that the analogy between the fourth and
sixth amendment rights is false on its own terms; they accept the premise of that

19681

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

vanced by California in opposition to the defendant's reliance, in
Schmerber v. California,24 on the Mapp decision2 5 even though the
conviction there involved the relatively minor misdemeanor of drunken
driving, for which the defendant received a thirty-day sentence. 26 And
although the Court denied the claimed fourth amendment violation in
Schmerber, it did so on the ground that the search was a reasonable
one,27 not on the ground that misdemeanants have no right to be free
from unreasonable searches. That a holding of the latter sort would
generally be considered exceedingly novel, whereas a similar holding
with respect to the right to appointed counsel would not, surely derives
from the special way in which lawyers nurtured on Betts- v. Brady28
and Bute v. Illinois29 have come to think about the right to appointed
counsel. Those decisions, limiting the right to cases involving "special
circumstances" or capital crimes,"0 inevitably engendered the belief
that while other constitutional rights might be available to criminal
defendants generally, the right to appointed counsel was to be granted
only sparingly, in cases of unarguable necessity.
The Court's opinion in Gideon provided no support for continuing
to conceive of the right to counsel in the restrictive, Bettsian manner.
Indeed, there was good reason to believe that Gideon sought to place
the right to counsel on an equal plane with other constitutional rights.
The opinion is framed not in terms of the rights of the felony defendant, but consistently and, one infers, studiously, in terms of the rights
of persons "charged with crime." 3 Such a characterization very arguably includes persons charged with crimes called misdemeanors. And
argument that the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures protects
the public generally, whereas the right to counsel protects only the accused's individual interest in the right determination of his guilt or innocence. The critical
defect in the argument, however, is that this basic postulate is false. Society also
benefits from the assurance of reliability that counsel for the indigent is designed
to provide. The point is nowhere more convincingly made than in the Allen Report:
The essence of the adversary system is challenge. The survival of our system of
criminal justice and the values which it advances depends upon a constant,
searching, and creative questioning of official decisions and assertions of authority at all stages of the process. The proper performance of the defense function
is thus as vital to the health of the system as the performance of the prosecuting
and adjudicatory functions.
ALLEN REPORT 10.
384 U.S. 757 (1966).

Brief for Respondent at 8-12, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
-Id. at 7.
"'384 U.S. at 770-72.
316 U.S. 455 (1942).
-333 U.S. 640 (1948).
n Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 676, 677 (1948)

" Gideon v. Wainvright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).

(dictum).
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the Court's per curiam decision in Patterson v. Warden,32 applying
Gideon to misdemeanors punishable by felony-length terms of imprisonment, increased the possibility that "crime," not "felony," was the
measure of the right. Indeed, it is fair to say that, at that juncture,
the apparent breadth of the Gideon opinion would also have supported the per curiam inclusion of some or all conventional misdemeanor offenses within the scope of the sixth amendment right to
counsel. Five years later it has become abundantly clear that the
Court believes that Gideon does not, of its own force, include misdemeanor offenses. The first task, therefore, is to trace the decline of
the misdemeanant's right from its Gideon-Pattersonapogee.
For three years following Gideon the situation remained relatively
unchanged. The Court's references to Gideon in Massiah v. United
States,3" Escobedo v. Illinois,3 4 and Miranda35 manifested no intent to
disturb the ambiguous status quo by recharacterizing Gideon either
more broadly or more narrowly than originally formulated. In 1966
the ambiguity ended. The occasion was the Court's denial of certiorari
in Winters v. Beck36 and DeJoseph v. Connecticut,37 cases in which
state courts had refused to apply Gideon to misdemeanor prosecutions.3" Dissenting from the denial of certiorari in Winters, Mr. Justice
Stewart took care to intimate no opinion as to the "ultimate resolution
of this problem," but had no doubt that "the answer cannot be made
to depend upon artificial or arbitrary labels of 'felony' or 'misdemeanor' attached to criminal offenses by 50 different states. ' 39 Dissenting in DeJoseph, Mr. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Black
and Douglas, urged the Court to "make clear the meaning of Gideon
-"372 U.S. 776 (1963), rev'g Patterson v. State, 227 Md. 194, 175 A.2d 746 (1961)
and remanding for "further consideration in light of Gideon...." The offenses
involved, although labelled "misdemeanors" under Maryland law, carried maximum
terms of two years' imprisonment. On remand, the Maryland court found Gideon to
be controlling, reversed the convictions and remanded for trial with appointed counsel. Patterson v. State, 231 Md. 509, 191 A.2d 237 (1963).
377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964).
,378 U.S. 478, 487 (1964).
384 U.S. 436, 472-73 (1966).
"385 U.S. 907 (1966).
.7 385 U.S. 982 (1966).
'In Winters, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the petitioner's conviction
for "immorality" under a city ordinance, for which he was sentenced to thirty days
in jail and to pay a fine of $254, converted by state law into 254 days of additional
imprisonment because of petitioner's inability to pay the fine. Winters v. Beck, 239
Ark. 1093, 397 S.W.2d 364 (1966). In DeJoseph, defendant was convicted of nonsupport, an offense punishable by up to a year's imprisonment, and received a sixmonth sentence. The right-to-counsel issue was seriously blurred by the Connecticut
court's finding that defendant had failed adequately to demonstrate his indigence.
State v. DeJoseph, 222 A.2d 752, 759 (Conn. Cir. 1966).
385 U.S. at 908-09.
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v. Wainwright."4 He again scrupulously avoided suggesting a view on
the merits of the issue. It is clear by this time, however, that what was
once in doubt-whether Gideon itself ruled cases such as Winters and
Deloseph-was no longer in question, the ambiguity having been resolved against inclusion of misdemeanor offenses.
Thus, in 1967, it is not surprising to find Mr. Justice Marshall
saying for the Court in Mempa v. Riay, "in Gideon v. Wainwright...
this Court held... that there was an absolute right to appointment of
counsel in felony cases."' I do not of course mean to suggest that any
of the foregoing bars a subsequent holding extending Gideon to include
some or all misdemeanor proceedings. The position is no longer tenable, however, in contrast to the situation nearly five years ago, that
that issue has already been decided in Gideon.
Although the Court in In re Gault, as in Mempa, read Gideon as
requiring appointed counsel only in felony cases,4" its recognition of
the juvenile's right to counsel at a delinquency adjudication puts in
question the continued vitality of the felony standard. The argument,
however, has its defects. Narrowly read, Gault is entirely consistent
with the felony standard. Although Gerald Gault's offense was a misdemeanor for which an adult could have been imprisoned for no more
than two months, as a 15-year-old delinquent committed to the state
Industrial School "for the period of his minority,"4 he received, in
effect, a six year "sentence." Moreover, as the Court notes,44 virtually
every delinquency adjudication exposes the juvenile to commitment for
a minimum of three years-the difference between the juvenile court's
jurisdiction to adjudicate, age 18 or under, and its power to commit
for the period of the child's minority. Under these circumstances, it
may be argued, the right to counsel recognized in Gault45 involves no
extension of the Gideon-Pattersonstandard. Indeed, since the commitment of a juvenile also operates to terminate the parents' right of
custody, the Gault decision may be said to follow a fortiori from
Gideon-Patterson.
"I!d. at 982.
"188 S. Ct. 254, 256 (1967) (emphasis added).

Similarly, in dissenting from the

Court's denial of certiorari in Heller, Mr. Justice Fortas argued that the Court

should consider "[wi]hether a prosecution for being 'found intoxicated,' subjecting the

defendant to as much as 30 days' imprisonment, is within the category of serious
state criminal prosecutions to which the federal constitution guarantee of assistance
of counsel applies, under the decisions of this Court," citing Gideon. Heller v.
Connecticut, 88 S. Ct. 213, 214 (1967) (emphasis added).
42387 U.S. at 29.
"Id. at 7.
"Id. at 37 n.60.
"Id. at 36.
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More generously interpreted, however, Gault offers hope for the
adult misdemeanant. The decision rests not only on the conclusion
that a delinquency proceeding "is comparable in seriousness to a
felony prosecution;" it also finds that counsel is essential to a fair and
reliable adjudication of the issues raised, as in Gault, by a misdemeanor accusation. In this respect, the adult misdemeanant, no
less than
[tihe juvenile [,] needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems
of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of
the proceedings,
and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare
46
and submit it.
This finding necessarily rejects the argument that appointed counsel
may be unnecessary in misdemeanor cases because such charges are
inherently less complicated than felony prosecutions. On the contrary, whether Gerald Gault's conduct was within the statute prohibiting "the use of vulgar language 'in the presence or hearing of' a
woman or child" was a matter about which the juvenile court judge
was himself "uncertain, '"" and it raised factual and legal issues as
bewildering to the layman as any that might have been raised by a
felony indictment.
Moreover, there is something at least anomalous about a constitutional scheme that provides counsel at the "critically important"
hearing to waive juvenile court jurisdiction to insure that "[t] he child
is protected against [the] consequences of adult conviction;" 4 that
now guarantees appointed counsel at the adjudication on the merits if
the waiver issue is decided in the juvenile's favor; but that, with respect to the same conduct alleged to violate the same statutory prohibition, denies counsel to the indigent-child or adult-in criminal court.
In a final and probably most significant sense the case for including
the misdemeanant among those entitled under the sixth amendment to
appointed counsel has surely improved in the years since Gideon. All
of the lower federal court decisions since (and before, for that matter)
Gideon in which the issue has been presented have extended the right
to misdemeanor proceedings. 9 With a few exceptions, the state court
46Id.
387 U.S. 36 n.58.
" Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556-57 (1966) ; In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12,

36 (1967).

" The leading cases are Evans v. Rives, 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (failure
to provide for minor child; one year jail sentence) ; Harvey v. Mississippi, 340
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decisions have been in the same direction. The period has also seen
the enactment of state and federal legislation, generally including at
least some misdemeanor offenses within the scope of the right. 0 By
expressing the consensus of the states51 and thereby blunting the edge
of whatever may be left of the "federalism" argument,5 2 these developments bode well for eventual constitutional recognition of the misdemeanant's right to counsel.
B. Equal Protection
Whether the demand for equality in the administration of the criminal law, as exemplified by Griffin v. Illinois,53 Douglas v. California54
and their progeny, focuses on any right-to-counsel interests not cognizable under the sixth amendment seems to me subject to serious
doubt.
In fashioning a right to appointed counsel during in-custody interrogation, the Court apparently perceived no relevant difference between the two sources of the right.
Denial of counsel to the indigent at the time of interrogation while allowing an attorney to those who can afford one would be no more supportable by reason or logic than the similar situation at trial and on appeal
struck down in Gideon v. Wainwright and Douglas v. California.55
Although Gideon is a sixth amendment case, Mr. Justice Black's
opinion for the Court suggests an equal protection rationale:
[T]here are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to
hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their defenses.
That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have
F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965) (possession of whiskey; $500 fine, ninety day jail sentence) ;
McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965) (illegal possession and sale of
whiskey $250 fine or six months in jail on each charge), discussed in L. HALL & Y.
KAMISAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 293-94 (2d ed. 1966). See also cases cited
infra notes 195, 223; but see note 224 infra.
'The state judicial and legislative developments are considered at length in the
Appendix. In federal courts, the right to appointed counsel is governed by the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 44. On

the operation of the Criminal Justice Act see, e.g., Hastings, The Criminal Justice Act
of 1964, 57 J. CRi. L.C. & P.S. 426 (1966); JUmOR BAR SECTION, BAR Ass'N OF THE
DisTRicT OF COLUMBIA, THE OPERATION OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE AcT IN THE DisTRICT OF COLUMBIA (1967).

Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1966); it re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 37-38
(1967).

r'See Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism and State Systems of Criminal

Justice, 8 DEPAUL L. REv. 213, 230 (1959).
=351 U.S. 12 (1956).
r'372 U.S. 353 (1963).

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472-73 (1966).
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the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal cases are necessities, not
luxuries.-5
While this language is doubtless responsive to the sixth amendment
inquiry of what process is due persons charged with crime (here determined by reference to common practice), it is relevant as well to the
equality principle. The extent to which the poor person charged with
crime should be made the equal of his wealthy counterpart should
depend not on the rights theoretically available to the defendant of
means, but upon the finding that such rights are in fact exercised by
him. 7 Accordingly, that "defendants who have the money" almost
always exercise their option to hire counsel supports an equal protection as well as a sixth amendment right to counsel.
The opposite is also true. The Court's appellate procedure cases,
although played on the equal protection scale, produce due process
overtones:
[A] State can, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for
differences so long as the result does not amount to a denial of due pro58
cess or an "invidious discrimination."
Although the sixth amendment and equal protection bases of the
right to counsel to a large extent overlap, the equality principle brings
an important new perspective to bear on the analysis of the right.
Historically, the sixth amendment counsel right has been a limited
one. Broad dicta to the contrary in both Powell v. Alabama59 and
0
Gideon v. Wainwright"
have not, as we have seen, carried the day.
But if the sixth amendment right to counsel appears inherently narrow, the equal protection right seems inherently broad. Indeed, as
the Allen Report demonstrates,"' the job of the reformer who would
rely upon the equal protection ban on "discrimination against the
indigent" is not so much to extend the right to counsel but to justify
its containment short of complete equality. This paper confronts that
"'372 U.S. at 344.

'See text accompanying notes 142-52 infra. "During the reign of Betts v. Brady,
the Court made it clear that denying a defendant the assistance of his own lawyer
in any case, at any stage, on any issue, constituted a per se violation of 'fundamental

fairness.'" L.

HALL

& Y. KAMISAR.

MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

272 (2d ed. 1966)

(emphasis in original). See Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954); Ferguson v.
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963) (emphasis added).

"287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932).
- 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
"

ALLEN REPORT

9-10.
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task in a later section. 2 For present purposes it is sufficient to note
that recognition of governmental discrimination against the poor as
an independent constitutional violation introduces a powerful new policy element into right-to-counsel analysis, which, unlike traditional
sixth amendment analysis, puts the burden of justification on those
who would continue the present economic discrimination against the
misdemeanant.
C. The Right to Counsel during Investigation
Recent Supreme Court decisions creating a right to appointed counsel during the investigatory stage of criminal proceedings suggest a
third ground for recognition of the indigent misdemeanant's right to
publicly provided defense counsel.
Ignoring factual and doctrinal details not relevant in the present
context, the Court's decisions in Massiah,63 Escobedo4 and Miranda65
recognize a right to appointed counsel during police investigation designed to elicit testimonial evidence from the accused. In United
States v. Wade6" and Gilbert v. California,67 the Court recognized a
similar right during any "critical" pretrial confrontation between the
government and the accused, and held that identification of an accused
at a pretrial line-up was such a confrontation.
At first glance, these cases establishing a right to counsel during
critical stages of the investigatory process appear to contribute no
ground for recognition of the indigent misdemeanant's right to counsel
beyond those already provided by Gideon.
Like that case, they all arose out of felony prosecutions and, like
Gideon, their applicability to misdemeanor prosecutions is itself open
to question. The counsel-during-investigation cases do, however, make
it more difficult to sustain the felony-misdemeanor distinction with
respect to trial counsel. That distinction can operate only in a setting
in which it is relatively clear into which category particular cases fall.
Trial or other formal disposition, the stage with which Gideon dealt,
is such a setting: the charge is either a felony or a misdemeanor. No
such certainty can be ascribed to the charge during the investigatory
stage. On the contrary, whether a given case will be disposed of as a
felony or as a misdemeanor is often a matter of great uncertainty,
See text accompanying notes 146-54 infra.
'377 U.S. 201 (1964).
378 U.S. 478 (1964).
388 U.S. 218 (1967).

384 U.S. 436 (1966).

388 U.S. 263 (1967).
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depending on at least (1) the gravity of the offense; (2) the state of
the evidence; (3) the willingness of government witnesses to cooperate
with the prosecution and, assuming willingness, their probable credibility; (4) the accused's prior record; (5) prosecutorial attitudes toward the offense; and (6) the state of the criminal docket in the
jurisdiction."
Although far from complete, the available data indicate that a substantial proportion of felony arrests are charged as misdemeanors."
Moreover, since investigation commonly overlaps the arrest, it is often
unclear just what the evidence, once obtained, will support. As a result, the investigatory stage of criminal proceedings is not a setting in
which cases may be authoritatively labelled either "felony" or "misdemeanor." Added to these dispositional uncertainties is the doctrinal
uncertainty whether the right to counsel during investigation is not
already applicable to misdemeanor prosecutions.
Faced with uncertainties of this magnitude and reluctant to risk an
adverse outcome for reasons unrelated to "factual guilt,"7 the rational
course for enforcement officers is to follow the MViranda- Wade procedures in every case. In any event, they may be expected to conform to
those procedures with respect to any case that may be disposed of
as a felony.
The point is not that the right to counsel during investigation will,
for the reasons given, tend to become de facto applicable to some or
all misdemeanors, and that the right should therefore be given de jure
recognition. Rather, the essential point is that de facto application of
the right to counsel during investigation powerfully suggests that the
right to counsel at triat or other disposition ought to be given comparable applicability. Absept such comparability of the earlier and later
rights to counsel, a substantial proportion of accused indigents will be
subjected to the anomalous procedure of being advised of their right
to counsel before interrogation and at other critical investigatory confrontations only to be denied counsel by the court when their case is
disposed of as a misdemeanor. To reverse Professor Kamisar's metaphor, should the defendant's rights in the "mansion" be any less than
those in the "gatehouse"? 7 1
' D.
50
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"Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge,
CALIF. L. REV. 11, 33 (1962); J.SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 114 (1966).
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II. Tm IMPACT OF COUNSEL ON THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
In assessing the case for providing defense services for indigent
persons one can no longer ignore the mounting criticism by observers
of the criminal justice system that the policy assumptions for providing such services simply do not square with social reality. The argument, not easily summarized, runs roughly as follows.
The conception of criminal adjudication to which broader provision
of defense services is a rational response is one that views the determination of guilt or innocence as "an adversary, combative proceed7
ing,"72 a system "resting upon an assumption of genuine conflict.1 1

Not coincidentally, it is this conception of the criminal process that
the Supreme Court has invoked in determining the existence of "critical stages" in the process to which the right to counsel applies. As
the Court said in the most recent of these cases, holding that a pretrial
line-up was such a stage,
[t] he presence of counsel at such critical confrontations, as at the trial
itself, operates to assure that the accused's interests will be74protected
consistently with our adversary theory of criminal prosecution.
Professor Packer has ably demonstrated that this view, which conforms to his "Due Process Model ' 7 5 of the criminal justice system, is
only one of a spectrum of views that range between that model and
its polar opposite, the "Crime Control Model.17 While the former
"looks very much like an obstacle course.., the Crime Control Model
resembles an assembly line.... "

It might be said of the Crime Control Model that, reduced to its barest
essentials and when operating at its most successful pitch, it consists of
two elements: (a) an administrative factfinding process leading77 to exoneration of the suspect, or to (b) the entry of a plea of guilty.

But, for Packer, these models were distortions of reality, designed
solely to "clarify the terms of discussion. 7 8 Other observers, however,
seem to suggest that Packer's "Crime Control Model" represents cur'Blumberg, Covert Contingencies in the Right to the Assistance of Counsel,
(emphasis in original) [hereinafter cited as
20 VAND L. Rlv. 581, 583 (1967)

Blumberg).
Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary Systemn, 11 CoNyLicT
52 (1967).
'United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
7 Packer, supra note 70, at 13-23.
70Id. at 9-13.
''Id.at 13.
7sId. at 6.

REsou IoN

VASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

f VOL. 43 : 685

rent "social reality" in the criminal courts system and that the defense
lawyer, whether privately or publicly retained, consciously strives to
maintain that system.
All the court personnel, including the accused's own lawyer, are co-opted
to become agent-mediators who help the accused redefine his situation
and restructure his perceptions consonant with a plea of guilty.79
Because the defense lawyer's product lacks "visibility," and because
the criminal accused always "loses," the argument runs, he must present to a fee-paying client a "stage managed image of a personage of
great influence and power in the court organization."" ° And because
court personnel are keenly aware of the extent to which the defense
attorney relies upon this "lawyer-client confidence game,"," "the lawyer is 'bound in' to the authority system of the court's organizational
discipline. 82
Further, all lawyers in the criminal courts system have continuing
relations with the prosecutor's office and the court, to which institutions, Blumberg argues, client demands will be subordinated.
Accused persons come and go in the court system scheme, but the structure and its occupational incumbents remain to carry on their respective
career, occupational and organizational enterprises. The individual tensions and conflicts a given accused person's case may present to all the
participants are overcome because the formal and informal relations of
all the groups in the court setting require it. The probability of con83
tinued future relations and interactions must be preserved at all costs.
Blumberg's argument that private counsel are conscripted to serve
administrative goals as a result of their complicitous relationship with
other court personnel in maintaining a fee-deserving image does not
adequately explain his attribution of similar behavior to counsel paid
from public funds. There is reason to believe, however, that such
attribution may be deserved.
In his study of a public defender office, Sudnow found that the defender "and the D.A., as co-workers in the same courts, take it for
granted that the persons who come before the courts are guilty of
Blumberg 586.
sId. 594.
Id. at 590, 593; cf. D.T. Bazelon, Clients Against Lawyers, HARPERS Sept., 1967,
104, at 110: "I realize that there is no legal practice without clients, but still [the
client] is irrelevant."
12 Blumberg
594.

3Id. 587.
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crimes and are to be treated accordingly ...2'" After observing the
same agency, Skolnick largely agreed, finding, however, that "the public defender, as an institution, does not significantly differ from other
'cooperative' defense attorneys. 8s 5
Most private defense attorneys usually operate on a theory of defense
similar to that of the public defender ....This theory presupposes the
guilt of the client, as a general matter ....
86
Moreover, Blumberg's data show that, regardless of the type of counsel-private, legal aid or assigned-clients in more than threequarters of the cases studied reported that counsel urged them to
plead guilty to a lesser charge at the first or second contact.8 7
Participants in the criminal process generally recognize the guilty plea
as an efficient means of adjusting limited court facilities to large numbers
of criminal cases.88
Thus far, the argument poses no real challenge to the extension of
defense services to indigent misdemeanants. Rather, it suggests that
because of situational pressures common to all systems of criminal
defense, such an extension may be somewhat less beneficial to the
misdemeanant than has been commonly supposed. But that suggests
no reason to exclude, on grounds of poverty, those services that counsel can perform for the indigent guilty plea defendant. These functions have been broadly categorized as:
Expert evaluation of the appropriateness of the guilty plea and aid in
obtaining charge and sentence leniency by plea negotiation. Both of these
are very important to the guilty defendants and, as a matter of fact, successful representation of the guilty requires knowledge and skills no less
demanding than representation at trial.8 9
At this point, therefore, the proponent of counsel for the misdemeanant may appropriately demur. May he demur as well to Blumberg's
further contention that the Court's decisions extending the right to
counsel to trial and pretrial proceedings will promote not the values of
due process but the ends compendiously denoted by Packer's "Crime
Control Model"?
The more libertarian rules will tend to produce the rather ironic end
" Sudnow, Normnal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public
Defender Offce, 12 SocIAL PROBLEms 255 (1964).

' Skolnick, supra note 73, at 53.

S Id. at 62.
7

s Blumberg 603.
Skolnick, supra note 73, at 54.
D. NEwmAN, CoNvIcTioN 198 (1966).
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result of augmenting the existing organizational arrangements, enriching
court organizations with more personnel and elaborate structure, which,
in turn will serve to maximize organizational goals of "efficiency" and
"production." Thus, many defendants will find that courts will possess
an even more sophisticated apparatus for processing them toward a
guilty plea!90
Thus, the full implications of the argument suggest that a conception
of the criminal process that conforms to social reality militates against
further extensions of the right to counsel.
An assault on this conception of "social reality" must call upon more
than the rhetoric of the "adversary" system, since the challenge asserts
that it is rhetoric only. Unfortunately, most proponents of a broadened right to counsel have felt no obligation to go beyond the ideology
of adversariness.
Is it necessary, however, to meet the challenge frontally? Is it not
a sufficient answer to say, with Newman, that the lawyer's skills are at
least potentially as relevant to the right resolution of non-trial disputes
as to the much-vaunted but numerically much less significant courtroom battle? 9' Newman's catalogue of the lawyer's functions in nontrial adjudication certainly suggests an affirmative response. He
ascribes to counsel the tasks of (1) assuring the accuracy of the guilty
plea, (2) assuring fairness in the plea-disposition by promoting client
understanding of the plea's effects and by demanding consistent treatment for his client, (3) assuring an adequate record of the conviction,
and (4) in the conscientious performance of these functions, ultimately promoting the client's amenability to the correctional process.9 Blumberg 605 (emphasis added).
"Newman estimates that "guilty pleas account for roughly 90 percent of all
criminal convictions." D. NEWMAN, supra note 89, at 8.
'2In increasing numbers, commentators on the criminal justice system have suggested that the fairness of the procedures employed in the guilt-determining process
may have an important effect on the amenability of the convicted defendant to treatment and rehabilitation. See, e.g., D. NEWMAN, supra note 88 at 224-30; ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ADVISORY CO.M,IMITTEE ON
SENTENCING AND REVIEW, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES

§ 1.2 and commentary at 25-27 (1967); Barkin, The Emergence of Correctional Law
and the Awareness of the Rights of the Convicted, 45 NEB. L. REV. 669, 671-72, 689
(1966) ;Bennett, To Secure the Right to Coursel, 32 J. Aas. JUD. Soc. 117, 181 (1949) ;
Studt, The Client's Image of the Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 200 (M1.
Rosenheim ed. 1962); Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L.
REV. 181, 207 (1967); Note, Procedural Due Process at Judicial Sentencinrg for Fedony, 81 HARV. L. REV. 821, 833-34 (1968); cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967);
REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT'S COaIMISSION ON LAW ENFORCE.MENT AND ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 85 (1967).

The idea has been forcefully expressed by a former director of the Federal Bureau
of Prisons:
The correctional process cannot begin to operate until somehow the bitterness
and antagonisms which are more often than not engendered by the legal process
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Nor are these functions merely theoretical. Contrary to the thrust
of Blumberg's argument, Silverstein found that in general unrepresented defendants were more likely to plead guilty than were defendants with counsel.13 More significantly, of the unrepresented guilty
plea defendants, "the overwhelming majority pleaded to the principal
offense rather than to a lesser offense." 9 4 Thus, regardless of whether
the high rate of guilty pleas is referable to co-optation of defense
counsel by the enforcement system or to a conscientious attempt by
counsel to minimize the range of imposable sanctions, it is demonstrable that with respect to matters of crucial importance both to the client
and to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system, counsel
plays an important role.
are overcome.... Since rehabilitation to be true and lasting must come from
within, nothing can be done with [the prisoner] until he has been purged of this
rancor. Much of the antagonism aroused can be avoided by fair and just treatment and representation throughout the proceedings. By minimizing errors,
misunderstanding and friction during the criminal proceedings, mental strains
and tensions can be lessened, bitterness avoided and the number who are incurably
warped substantially reduced.
Bennett supra at 181.
The notion that criminal detection and adjudication procedures serve a therapeutic (or counter-therapeutic) function should be skeptically examined. It is an
empirical proposition that is unsupported, so far as I have been able to discover,
by any systematically gathered and analyzed empirical evidence. And there is no
a priori case for attributing any significant or lasting effect, either positive or
negative, to the procedure used by government officials during the investigation
and disposition of a convicted defendant's case. That episode, after all, represents
only one of countless experiences in the life of the defendant, and must certainly be
less important in shaping the individual's attitude toward governmental authority
than, say, his daily treatment during a period of incarceration. Nevertheless, the
persistence and pervasiveness of the belief that the criminal adjudication process
may produce social pathology in the same way that the physician's waiting room
may produce physical pathology warrants further investigation and reflection.
Although the process from apprehension to conviction may be but one stimulus
contributing to the individual's attitudes toward authority and society, it may well
be a decisive experience. His confrontation with established authority is not ephemeral or diffuse; it is face-to-face, the defendant versus the state. The stakes, obviously, are high, and in combination with the dramaturgical character of the adjudication process, will tend to give the conviction episode an inordinate salience.
Finally, in those cases that result in incarceration or even conditional freedom,
every real or imagined restriction of freedom may serve, over a long period, to
remind the individual of the enforcement process to which they are all attributable. Of
course, he could reflect upon the criminal conduct to which this process is in turn
attributable, resolving to avoid official sanctions by avoiding such conduct. And this, I
take it, is the goal of procedural "therapy": to render attacks against the "system"
impossible, or at least implausible, so that the correctional therapy theoretically
available for use in rehabilitating the offender will not be thwarted by the existence
of "jurido-genic" pathology.
In light of these conflicting and equally plausible theoretical positions on the
role of criminal procedure in the rehabilitative process, resolution of the issue must
await the evidence. The evidence should be directed as well toward what one sociologist, referring to prison practices, has termed the "irony of a somewhat therapeutic and permissive policy-the inmate becomes less able to protect his ego by
directing hostility to external targets." E. GOFFMAN, AsYLuMs 58 (1961).
11 SmvExRsTEiN 98-99.
01Id. at 91.
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Moreover, even if one accepts Blumberg's view of the criminal
process as an accurate portrayal of social reality, the range of appropriate responses surely encompasses more than "succumbing to the
inevitability of a reality that deviates from the ideal."9 5
Newman notes, for example, that meaningful representation is hindered in systems in which the defendant makes an early informal commitment to plead guilty, counsel being appointed only later in the
process. Under these circumstances, non-trial adjudication "is typically less an intense shared search for an appropriate plea than a sort
of cursory checkup by counsel of a plea already decided upon by the
defendant."9 6 The forthright response to this situation is to provide
an absolute right to counsel during plea bargaining by recognizing such
confrontations as "critical stages" in the criminal process.
A measured response to Blumberg, still demurring to his view of
social reality, may involve less whether to provide counsel for indigent
defendants than how to provide those services. As we have seen,
Blumberg's argument is weakest when applied to publicly retained
and compensated counsel, who have, one would assume, no motive for
creating or maintaining the fee-deserving image that, Blumberg asserts, weds defense counsel to enforcement goals. Appointed private
counsel who are also regular criminal court practitioners, however,
probably cannot escape the systemic pressures associated with feecollection in their private cases. Itis in the nature of an image that it
must be scrupulously maintained, even under seemingly irrelevant
circumstances.
What this suggests is something qttite' compatible with other demands likely to be associated with providing counsel in misdemeanor
cases: that such defense be rendered by a public defender. The added
demand for legal services may recommend a defender office as the
most efficient means for meeting it.97 More important to the present
analysis, a public defender office may be most resistant to the pressures exerted by the enforcement system.
In general, the power of the prosecutor over the defense function
derives from his ability to frustrate defense goals. The individual
attorney, whether privately retained or for-this-case assigned, enjoys
no countervailing influence. But, "as a result of the cases it controls,
the PD's office is in a structurally advantageous position"9 8 vis-a-vis
° Skolnick, supra note 73, at 70.
ooD. NSVA AN, supra note 89, at 204.
1" Cost data are collected in I SILVERSTEIN 63-69.
"Skolnick, supra note 73, at 63.
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the prosecutor. In essence, what is being suggested is that against the
enforcement system's "monstrous appetite for the co-optation of entire
professional groups as well as individuals,"" an equivalent defense
organization, possessing the ability to frustrate prosecutorial objectives, stands the best chance to survive in the criminal courts arena
with its principles intact.
Thus, contrary to the argument that the social structure necessarily imposes cooperation in DA-PD relations... the structure of the situation
would appear to give the PD relatively greater organization leverage
over the DA. 00
III. WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE?

Much of the discussion concerning extension of the right to appointed counsel beyond the facts of Gideon revolves around the search
for a principle that will contain that right, once loosed from its felony
moorings, within bounds that are financially and logistically feasible. 10 1
The feared inability of the legal profession to accommodate a potential
eightfold increase0 2 in the demand for appointed counsel, 0 3 coupled
with the felt unlikelihood or unwisdom of expending the public resources necessary to provide defense services on such a scale, 104 has
invariably led to a variety of proposals for limiting the right.
A. Spurious Standards
The suggestion that the right be limited to cases in which the misdemeanant appears to have a defense of real sustance or in which
complicated issues of fact er law are anticipated seems clearly spurious.'01 Despite the apparent ability of such a standard to discriminate
with great sensitivity between deserving and non-deserving cases, it
7
has been found to be unworkable in fact 0 6 and unacceptable in law. 0
Limiting the right to those cases in which appointed counsel is requested warrants even shorter shrift. Few constitutional principles
Blumberg 605.
'® Skolnick,

supra note 73, at 63.
"l Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942); McDonald v. Moore, 353 F2d 106,
108-09 (5th Cir. 1965); Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota:
Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MiNiT. L. Rv. 1, 62-88.

(1963).

-- See text infra at notes 156-60.
"See, e.g., People v. Lettorio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 213 N.E.2d 670, 672, 266 N.Y.S2ct
368, 371 (1965).
104 Kamisar & Choper, supranote 101, at 84.

' L. HALL & Y. K.ansAm, MODERN CRnnNAL PRoCEDuRE 295 (2d ed. 1966).
'0 Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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are more firmly established than the proposition that where an
individual is otherwise entitled to counsel, the existence of the right
cannot be made to depend upon a request.'
B. The Petty Offense Standard
Of all the formula, by which it has been sought to contain the right
to appointed counsel (or to explain its containment), only the "petty
offense"' 09 argument claims to rest upon affirmative Supreme Court
precedent. The argument can be stated with disarming simplicity:
because the sixth amendment right to a trial by jury does not extend
to "petty offenses,"" 0 neither does the sixth amendment right to counsel."' More technically, the argument asserts that the term "criminal
prosecutions" qualifies all of the rights enumerated in the sixth amendment, and since in the jury trial cases that term has been interpreted
to exclude "petty offenses," it follows as a matter of conventional interpretation that a similar exclusion applies to the right to counsel.
The argument is fundamentally unsound. In the first place, it assumes the existence of a tolerably certain and stable definition of the
term "petty offense." The cases belie such an assumption. Whether
an offense is"petty" for purposes of determining the existence of a
right to jury trial has been held to turn upon a two-dimensional analysis of the nature of the offense and the severity of the penalty imposed
or imposable for its violation. Thus the offense of selling second-hand
property without a license, carrying a penalty of ninety days' imprisonment, is "petty" for jury trial purposes, 2 while a traffic offensereckless driving "so as to endanger property and individuals" punishable by thirty days' imprisonment or a $100 fine-is "an act of such
obvious depravity that to characterize it as a petty offense would be to
"Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 470-72 (1966) ; but cf. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1964).
-18 U.S.C. § 1(3) (1964): "Any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not
exceed imprisonment for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500, or
both, is a petty offense." It was this "petty offense" standard that Congress adopted
for purposes of containing the right to compensated appointed counsel in federal criminal cases. Criminal Justice Act of 1964. 18 U.S.C. §3006A (1964). It is possible, of
course, to define "petty offenses" more narrowly. In New Hampshire, for example,
"a petty offense is any misdemeanor, the penalty for which does not provide for imprisonment or a fine exceeding five hundred dollars." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-A :1
(Supp. 1967). For constitutional purposes, however, the "petty offense" concept implies no such rigid test. Indeed, according to some commentators, the very dynamism
of the concept commends its use as a device for delineating the scope of the right
to counsel. Kamisar & Choper, supra note 101, at 73.
"'ODistrict of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
" Kamisar & Choper, supra note 101, at 71.
112 District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
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shock the general moral sense. ' 113
But to criticize the petty offense standard on these grounds is, in a
sense, misleading. For such criticism appears to assume the existence
of a sound doctrinal and policy base for extending that standard (were
it knowable) from the jury trial cases to the right to counsel situation.
In fact no such basis exists.
The argument for use of the jury trial standard to contain the scope
of the right to counsel fails because it proves far too much. As we
have seen, its doctrinal foundation is that the jury trial cases authoritatively define the scope of the term "criminal prosecutions" which
qualifies all of the rights protected by the sixth amendment. Applied
only to the rights to trial by jury and to counsel the argument has (for
different reasons) a certain surface plausibility. The sixth amendment
also guarantees, however, the right to a speedy and public trial, the
right to an impartial jury in the district in which the offense was committed, the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to confront and cross-examine prosecution witnesses, and the
right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses for the defense.
The proposition that these other sixth amendment rights might constitutionally be denied to petty offenders is refuted by its very statement. It is simply not arguable, nor has any court ever held, that the
trial of a petty offense may be held in secret, or without notice to the
accused of the charges, or that in such cases the defendant has no
right to confront his accusers or to compel the attendance of witnesses
in his own behalf. "Under our Constitution," to paraphrase Gault,
"the condition of being a [petty offender] does not justify a kangaroo
M14

court."

That the petty offense standard does not and cannot operate to deny
petty offenders those basic trial rights set forth in the sixth amendment
seems self-evident. The straight-faced acceptance of the notion that
the right to counsel has no application to petty offenses, 115 however,
warrants further consideration. The cases demonstrate that, far from
carrying all other sixth amendment protections in its wake, the right
to trial by jury alone has been limited to "non-petty" offenses. The
leading jury trial case, District of Columbia v. Clawans," 6 provides a
perfect example. While the Court there held that the respondent was
District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967).
Karnisar & Choper, supra note 101, at 71; see Criminal Justice Act of 1964,
18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
11300 U.S. 617 (1937).
1
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not entitled to a jury trial in a "criminal proceeding" under an ordinance prohibiting the sale of second-hand goods, it reversed the conviction on the ground that the trial judge had prejudically restricted
respondent's cross-examination of the prosecution's expert witnesses." 7
Although the reversal was not based on the sixth amendment, a constitutional foundation for the right of cross-examination in the trial of
"petty offenses" may be found in the contempt cases.
It is now clear that the sixth amendment does not bar punishment
for criminal contempt by a summary trial without a jury where the
penalty imposed is no greater than that provided for petty offenses.
Whether other sixth amendment protections may also be dispensed
with in the trial of "petty" criminal contempts was the issue raised in
In re Oliver."9 There the petitioner challenged by writ of habeas
corpus his summary imprisonment for contempt by a Michigan "oneman grand jury." The Court found that because of the "haste and
secrecy" with which the petitioner had been adjudged in contempt, he
had "no chance to prepare his defense, and no opportunity either
to cross-examine the other grand jury witness or to summon witnesses
to refute the charge against him." 2 ° Since the maximum penalty imposable under Michigan law was sixty days' imprisonment and a $100
fine, the offense was, for jury trial purposes, arguably "petty" under
then-existing standards,'
and clearly "petty" under present stand2
ards.
Neither the parties nor the Court, however, seems even to have
considered the possibility that the petty offense concept justified the
procedure followed. On the contrary, the Court held the procedure
violative of fourteenth amendment due process:
A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an
opportunity to be heard in his defense-a right to his day in court-are
basic in our system of jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the witnesses against him, to offer testimony,
12
and to be represented by counsel. 3
'1Id.at 630.
...
Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 378-80 (1966). For a criticism of this
development in the context of an earlier case, see Tefft, United States v. Burnett:
"Twas a Famous Victory," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 123.

"-333 U.S. 257 (1948).
12 Id. at 259.

"' District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
"'Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966).
"in re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). Were Oliver to be decided today, it
is clear that the holding would be based on the specific provisions of the sixth
amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S.
363 (1966) ; Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
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The response to the argument that the Court's jury trial decisions
govern all sixth amendment rights, including the right to counsel, may
be even more strongly put. Sixth amendment rights other than the
jury trial right are not only applicable both to petty and non-petty
offenses, they are applicable as well to non-offenses. In Greene v.
McElroy 24 the Court avoided what it termed "serious constitutional
problems"' 2 by finding no executive or legislative delegation of power
to the Department of Defense authorizing the use of an industrial
security clearance program that denied affected individuals the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses against them. Similarily, in
Reilly v. Pinkus 26 the Court forbade "so mild a whip"" 7 as restricting
an individual's use of the mails where his right to cross-examine government witnesses had been denied at the injunction hearing.
Clearly, then, the jury trial cases can have no necessary effect on the
proper scope of the right to counsel in "criminal prosecutions." At
best they are doctrinally neutral, establishing only that the sixth
amendment protects two species of rights: those like the right to jury
trial that apply only to non-petty offenses and those like the right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses that apply to the trial of all
offenses, petty and nonpetty alike. The ease with which it has been
assumed that the right to counsel could for these purposes be placed
in the former category seems to me to stem not from any real equivalence of the jury trial and counsel rights. What the right to counsel
and the right to trial by jury have in common that largely distingishes
them from other sixth amendment rights is that both require sizable
out-of-pocket expenditures of public funds. A trial can be speedy and
public as cheaply as it can be delayed and secret. It costs little or
nothing to inform the defendant of the charges against him. And
although trials without the rights to confront and cross-examine prosecution witnesses or to compel the attendance of defense witnesses
could obviously be conducted less expensively, in the ordinary misdemeanor case the savings would not appear to be substantial. 28
- 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
lZId. at 507.

~338

U.S. 269 (1949).

Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7 (1964).

In their study of criminal jury trials, Kalven and Zeisel found that in 84%
of the cases studied the defense called no more than five witnesses (and in 35% of
the cases, no more than one witness). The comparable figures for the prosecution
were 58% (no more than five) and 2% (no more than one). H. K Vrnr & H. ZEISEL,
THE Aa! l=E
R JuRy 136 (1966). Since their sample was at least two-thirds felony
offenses (id. at 41) it seems fair to assume that it overstates the number of witnesses that would ordinarily be involved in the trial of misdemeanor offenses.
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While this sort of fiscal analysis may help to explain the tendency
to apply to the right to counsel the restrictive scope of the jury trial
right rather than the broader scope applicable to all other sixth amendment rights, it does not justify that tendency.
Until very recently, it would have been possible at this point to
make a reasonably strong case for the proposition that the jury trial
right is a sport among the rights protected by the sixth amendment;
that unlike other sixth amendment rights, the right to a jury could be
restricted without impairing any legitimate interest of the bench-tried
defendant; and that, since the same could not be said of the unrepresented defendant, the right to counsel ought not to be so restricted.2 9
In light of Kalven and Zeisel's finding that in criminal cases "the
jury trials show on balance a net leniency [in favor of the defendant]
of 16 percent" ' (and assuming that criminal defendants have a "legitimate" interest in benefiting from jury leniency) the argument that
the jury trial right is a constitutional sport can no longer stand. This
is not to say, however, that the argument's conclusion should now be
abandoned. Rather, the jury data suggest that the error has been in
restricting the right to jury trial to nonpetty offenses. If this is so,
surely the rational response is to reverse that error,' 3' not to magnify
its effect by imposing a similar restriction on the scope of the right
to counsel.
C. Imprisonment Standards
Even jurisdictions that have recognized a broad right to counsel in
misdemeanor cases have generally restricted its scope to offenses pun' It was precisely this argument that led the Minnesota court to reject the
"petty offense" standard:
But even though the two rights derive from the same provisions of our
Federal Constitution, they are not of equal significance when it comes to the
matter of obtaining a fair trial. It is conceivable that a fair trial may be had
before an impartial judge without a jury, but it is hardly conceivable that a
person ignorant in the field of law can adequately defend himself without the
assistance of counsel. Consequently, we do not consider the cases involving the
right to a jury trial controlling in this area.
State v. Borst, -Minn.-, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967).
" H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, supra note 128, at 59. "This means that in the
cases which the defendant decides to bring before the jury, on balance, he fares
better 16% of the time than he would have in a bench trial." Id.
"' The scope of the constitutional right to trial by jury is before the Court this
Term. Bloom v. Illinois, 235 IIl. 2d 255, 220 N.E.2d 475 (1966), cert. granted,
386 U.S. 1003 (1967) ; Duncan v. Louisiana, 250 La. 253, 195 So. 2d. 142 (1967), prob.
juris. noted, 389 U.S. 809 (1967). For conflicting views on the issue see Frankfurter
& Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury,
39 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1926); Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, U. CHi. L.
REv. 245 (1959).
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ishable by imprisonment.
As used in those jurisdictions, "imprisonment" appears always to mean imprisonment-in-law: if the law allows'
the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment on conviction of the
offense charged, such an offense is "punishable by imprisonment,"
invoking the right to counsel. Since even the most trivial misdemeanors are often, in this sense, "punishable" by imprisonment, adoption
of this standard potentially imposes a heavy burden on the legal profession and on the public purse.
By shifting from a "legal" to a "factual" emphasis, the imprisonment standard may be more narrowly defined. Thus, appointed counsel could be provided in misdemeanor proceedings that, as a matter of
fact, put the indigent misdemeanant's liberty in jeopardy. The imprisonment-in-fact standard may be applied in two quite different
ways. On the one hand, it could require, as has been suggested,1 3 a
determination by the trial judge of the likelihood of imprisonment in
the particular case before him. On the other hand, it could require
the appointment of counsel in those classes of cases in which, in the
event of conviction, there is some likelihood of imprisonment.
The former, case-by-case approach is the narrowest and therefore
the least expensive formulation of the imprisonment standard. It appears capable of selecting from among the vast number of misdemeanors punishable, on paper, by imprisonment only those in which imprisonment in fact threatens. At the same time, it raises several difficult issues not encountered under the alternative formulation of the
imprisonment-in-fact standard. Does it not share some of the difficulties that made Betts v. Brady practically impossible to administer?'
How certain can a judge be, ifhe-has not-prejudged the case, that
imprisonment maFbr may not be imposed? Must he not know, according to modem notions of individualized sentencing, facts that he
ought not know prior to the adjudication of the defendant's guilt or
innocence? The case-by-case approach has other shortcomings. Viewed
cynically, it empowers the beleagured judge and, through him, perhaps
the prosecutor uncertain of the strength of his case, to forestall an
effective challenge to the charges by foregoing imprisonment but not
conviction. Finally, even were the standard workable and immune to
possible abuse, is it not too selective?' 35 Certainly in many felony
'See Appendix at notes 276-80.
'2 L. HALL & Y. KA nsAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 295 (2d ed. 1966).

" Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349, 350-51 (1963)
curring).
'L. HALL & Y. KKSm(AR, supranote 133, at 295-96.

(Harlan, J., con-
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prosecutions it is possible to predict with fair certainty that the defendant if convicted will not be imprisoned, but because of the stigma that
attaches to a felony conviction, we would be properly reluctant to
withhold the right to counsel in such cases. There is no reason to be
less reluctant to do so when that stigma is the result of a misdemeanor
conviction.
What is needed, therefore, is a standard that guarantees a right to
counsel in any case as to which imprisonment or stigma is a predictable result. There is reason to believe that the "imprisonable class"
formulation of the imprisonment-in-fact standard, while not designed
to include stigmatizing offenses, would in practice draw just such a
line. Extending the right to counsel to those classes of cases in which
there is in fact some likelihood of imprisonment also avoids other
difficulties associated with a case-by-case approach: since the decision
to appoint counsel depends on a pre-selection of the classes of cases in
which liberty may be jeopardized, that decision can neither taint nor
be tainted by the defendant's probable culpability.
The "imprisonable class" standard, however, is not without its own
difficulties. Unlike other imprisonment standards, the imprisonable
class standard is not self-executing. The standard assumes that we
know, or can discover, those classes of misdemeanor offenses which,
although in law punishable by imprisonment, in acutality never or
rarely result in imprisonment. A field study of all criminal and related
proceedings in Seattle, Washington illustrates both the relative simplicity of the empirical task and the scope of the right to counsel
delineated by the imprisonable class standard.' 36
It was discovered that the accused faces a more than negligible
. Junker, Report on the Need for Publicly Provided Counsel in King County
(1965), reproduced in part as Appendix A to NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER
ASSOCIATION, HOW TO ORGANIZE A DEFENDER OFFICE, 39-51 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as NLADA DEFENDER]. The methodology of the study was essentially the same as
that used by the American Bar Foundation in gathering data for DEFENSE OF THE
POOR, involving primarily surveys or samples of docket information and interviews
with court officials.
Although the data of necessity reflect the experience of only one jurisdiction,
that factor seems less critical in this context than in others. A proposed standard
for the appointment of counsel ought to be evaluated by its probable impact on a
going criminal justice system. And since the administration of criminal justice in
this country is extremely decentralized, it is appropriate to measure that impact
microcosmically. Moreover, the "imprisonable class" standard assumes that such data
will be separately gathered in those jurisdictions that adopt the standard. (This
means, of course, that adoption of the imprisonable class standard could result in the
Balkanization of the right to counsel. The range of permissible variation, however,
would be extremely narrow, limited in practice to the inclusion or exclusion of
various traffic offenses.)
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possibility of incarceration 3 7 in all non-traffic misdemeanor cases.

38

Most traffic offenders, on the other hand, are not imprisoned, and
those who are in jeopardy of imprisonment fall into clearly definable
classes.
Forty thousand traffic charges (arising out of 150,000 non-parking
traffic citations) were disposed of by court action in Seattle during
1964. The study showed, however, that in only about 4,500 cases was
there any possibility of imprisonment as the result of a traffic conviction.'39 In only three kinds of cases was the accused exposed to any
danger of imprisonment: (1) where the offense charged was hit-andrun, reckless or drunken driving; or (2) where any additional traffic
violation was charged against an individual subject to a suspended
sentence for a previous violation; or (3) where, whatever the offense
charged, the convicted individual was unable to pay the fine imposed. 40
Thus, in one locality at least, the imprisonable class standard appears to comply with all of the criteria that have been suggested. All
persons in fact subject to the possibility of imprisonment or criminal
stigma are entitled -to representation. The standards for eligibility
can be stated without reference to particular cases, and appointments
may, if desired, be administered well in advance of trial by nonjudicial court personnel. The potential demand for counsel in traffic
cases is only one-tenth as large as that produced by the "imprisonment-in-law" standard.
The imprisonable class standard is more easily described than justified. The demand for reliability and fairness to which the right to
counsel responds exists as well in cases that do not jeopardize the
accused's liberty as in those that do. With respect to non-imprisonable
classes of cases, "the kind of trial a man gets" would still depend "on
the amount of money he has."'
Several possible defenses of the imprisonable class standard may be
' No effort was made to determine in advance the threshhold level of likelihood
of incarceration that would warrant characterizing an offense as "imprisonable."
In applying the standard, a 5% probability of imprisonment was deemed to be "more
than negligible." NLADA DEFNDR 40-41. This figure is also a measure of the
"waste" produced by the "imprisonable class" standard in comparison with the caseby-case approach: to assure representation of the one individual in twenty who
faces imprisonment, it must also be offered to nineteen other defendants who, we
may predict, are not so jeopardized.
NLADA DEFENDER 40, 42-43, 51.
" Not all of whom, of course, were indigent. NLADA DEFENDER 41-42, 48.
4 Grid.

'"IGriffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)
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offered. The first is that the line thus drawn does not purport to be a
principled one; that it is nothing more or less than the best compromise between the demands of constitutional policy and the limitations of purse and personnel. Such a defense is inadequate. The same
could be said with equal plausibility of the lines now drawn between
felonies and misdemeanors or between misdemeanors carrying varying
maximum penalties. The proposition that any of these standards represents the "best" compromise must rest on some basis more compelling than mere assertion.
Liberally construed, what the sixth and fourteenth amendments may
be said to require of the right to counsel is that it be provided for any
person "charged with crime ' '14 2 and that the indigent defendant enjoy
"the same rights and opportunities ...as nearly as is practicableas are enjoyed by those persons who are in a similar situation but are
' 14 3
able to afford the retention of private counsel.
The imprisonable class standard more nearly meets these requirements than any other. What constitutes being "charged with crime"
must, of course, be measured by a constitutional definition of "crime."
The states can no more expand the scope of the Gideon dictum by
attaching the label of "crime" to conduct popularly perceived and
officially treated as non-criminal than they could contract the scope
of the Gideon holding by labelling serious offenses carrying felonylength sentences "misdemeanors." '44 Without attempting a complete
constitutional definition of "crime," there is little doubt that for sixth
amendment purposes it ought to include proceedings in which the
individual is exposed to the possibility of incarceration or to the stigma
that flows from official condemnation.1 4 If this analysis is sound,
there is no war between sixth amendment doctrine and the imprisonable class standard. Obviously, the same cannot be said of less inclusive standards.
Squaring the imprisonable class standard with the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment poses more difficult issues. Logically extended from its present doctrinal base, the constitutional ban
on discrimination against the indigent requires that he be given appointed counsel in any proceeding in which a financially able person
may appear with counsel. Obviously, if this is what equal protection
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 745 (1967).
144 Patterson v. Warden, 372 U.S. 776 (1963)
(per curiam).
145Hart,
The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 402-06
(1958) ; see Kamisar & Choper, supra note 101, at 68-69.
'
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requires, no imprisonment standard can survive constitutional challenge. Indeed, such an interpretation of the equality principle makes
irrelevant all attempts at drawing the line beyond which appointed
counsel need not be provided, since, on this view, the equal protection
clause itself draws that line. On both theoretical and doctrinal
grounds, however, it is possible to liberate discussion of the scope of
the right to counsel from the hold of the "logic" of equality. Unfettered by the conclusions built into that logic, it becomes possible to
consider the grounds upon which a lesser scope of the right might be
justified.
Underlying the expansive view of the scope of equal protection is
the theory that all defendants must be given an equal opportunity to
be represented by counsel; that opportunity, self-provided by the financially able, must be government-provided for the indigent. It is
far from clear, however, that equal protection demands adoption of
this theory. According to Griffin, what is forbidden is allowing "the
kind of trial a man gets," to depend "on the amount of money he
has."' 4 6 Compliance with Griffin does not automatically require appointment of cofinsel in all cases in which persons not barred by
poverty might hire counsel. That result is mandatory only if it can
be shown that the financially able in fact hire counsel in all such
cases; for if they do not, financial ability is clearly irrelevant to the
trial of such cases. An example will clarify. If it is found that
no one, rich or poor, bothers to hire counsel to defend against
illegal parking charges, why should equal protection require that
counsel be provided for the poor in such cases? According to
Griffin, counsel need not be provided, since the amount of money the
defendant has is irrelevant to the kind of trial he will receive. Accordingly, the imprisonable class standard can be made to conform to
Griffin, and thus to the equal protection clause, if it can be demonstrated that in non-imprisonable classes of cases counsel are rarely if
ever hired even by those financially able to do so. While the data are
far from conclusive, the Seattle study provides some evidence in support of the commonly held assumption that even the rich are not
represented in minor traffic proceedings. In Seattle it was found that
persons charged with two non-imprisonable offenses-speeding and
driving without a license-hired counsel in only about 6.5 percent of
"40351 U.S. at 19.
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the sample cases.14 In contrast, persons charged with imprisonable
traffic offenses-hit-and-run, reckless or drunken driving-hired counsel in 47 percent of the cases studied.1 48 These figures suggest,
though they do not demonstrate, that compliance with equal protection
is not necessarily inconsistent with adoption of the imprisonable class
standard.
The proposition that equal protection demands exactly equal treatment of rich and poor defendants is also vulnerable on doctrinal
grounds. In the first place, application of the equal protection clause
has, in terms, been limited to cases challenging appellate procedures. 4 9
Moreover, even in that limited sphere, the equality principle has never
been extended to the limit of its logic.'5
Finally, the Court has recently held that not every discrimination against the impoverished
appellant is constitutionally forbidden. While the financially able may
insist upon full prosecution of a frivolous appeal, the indigent is entitled only to counsel's "conscientious examination" of his case and to
"a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal." 15 ' If equality on appeal need be attained only "as
nearly as is practicable,' 5 2 equality at trial, to which the equal protection doctrine has never been explicitly applied, surely requires no
more.
I do not suggest that these theoretical and doctrinal arguments conclude discussion of the appropriate scope of the right to counsel in
misdemeanor cases, but rather that they liberate that discussion from
the apparent inexorability of the equality principle. The notion of
equality, however, exerts an important residual influence on the formulation of the constitutional issue. Whereas sixth amendment doctrine
focuses on the constitutional necessity of extending the right to counsel
to previously excluded classes of indigents, equal protection doctrine
questions whether any such exclusions are justifiable. On what
grounds may equality legitimately be denied? Two rationales may be
" Junker, Report on the Need for Publicly Provided Counsel in King County,
Appendix D (1965)
(unpublished, on file at the University of Washington and
Harvard law libraries) ; State v. Borst,--Miinn.-, 154 N.W.2d 888, 898 (1967)
(concurring opinion) : "It is a matter of general knowledge that many people who can
afford to do so nevertheless do not engage counsel in defense of traffic violations....
Cf. In re Johnson, 62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 427, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228, 235 (1965).
"

NLADA

DEFENDER

41.

E,g.. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.
353 (1963); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
" Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REV.
783 (t961).
"'Anders v. (alifornia, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
f"d. at 745.
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suggested. First, there are those cases with respect to which it seems
fair to say the consequences of non-representation are de minimis,
either because the sanctions are slight or because the disparity in result referable to the absence of counsel is insubstantial.'5 3 Second,
it seems impossible responsibly to ignore the financial and manpower
demands on the legal system that strict equality might impose." 4 The
administration of justice is not advanced by promising more than it
can deliver. Moreover, to limit equality of treatment on this ground
does not foreclose reconsideration of the issue in light of revised estimates of the predictable demand for legal services or of society's
ability to meet that demand.
On this analysis, non-imprisonable offenses would seem justifiably
excluded from the scope of the right to counsel. By definition, neither
incarceration nor stigma results from conviction for such an offense.
At the same time, the exclusion of non-imprisonable offenses relieves
the legal system of responsibility for the vast majority of traffic offenses and the feared inundation they represent.
IV.

SPECULATIONS ON THE PERSISTENCE
OF THE FELONY STANDARD

As we have seen, the doctrinal and policy bases for recognizing the
indigent misdemeanant's claim to appointed counsel tap not one but
several powerful strands of constitutional doctrine. Moreover, the
issue implicates basic goals of the criminal justice system, both with
respect to the fair and efficient treatment of alleged offenders and in
terms of the impact of the criminal process on the quality of American
society generally.
Yet in all but a handful of states many, and in twenty-one states
nearly all, indigent misdemeanants are forced to defend against criminal charges without the assistance of counsel. Nor does the constitutional issue appear any closer to resolution than it was nearly five
years ago, at the time of the Gideon decision. In some ways, in fact,
u'Kamisar, Has the Court Left the Attorney General Behind? - The BazelonKatzenbach Letters on Poverty, Equality and the Administration of Criminal Justice, 54 Ky. L.J. 464, 483 (1966).
"r'When questions of proper procedure implicate as well the proper allocation of

scarce public funds, it may be appropriate to consider the financial impact produced
by procedural change-here, the extension of the right to appointed counsel to the
marginal case. It is not self-evident that the need for counsel in non-imprisonable
classes of cases is more pressing than the need for housing, adequate medical care,
improved educational opportunities or any of a host of other exigent demands of
contemporary society.
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resolution now appears more distant. 55 The ability of the status of
the misdemeanant's right to counsel to remain relatively unchanged
during a period otherwise characterized by rapid, radical developments
in the rights of persons accused of crime demands some explanation.
The answer suggested here has several aspects, most of which may be
subsumed under the heading of the "magnitude" of the task of providing adequate defense services for the misdemeanant population.
At its most elementary level, the "magnitude" issue is one simply of
numbers. It is estimated that about 5,000,00056 persons annually are
charged with misdemeanors, excluding traffic offenses-more than
fourteen times the number of persons charged with felonies.
Focusing more narrowly on the indigent accused, the misdemeanorfelony ratio drops to eight-to-one, based on estimates that there are
about a million and a quarter indigent defendants charged with nontraffic misdemeanors each year, 5 7 as compared to about 150,000 indigent felony defendants. 5 8 Put in terms of the demand for lawyers'
services, it is estimated that "the number of lawyers working full-time
on the prosecution and defense needed to satisfy the demand for lawyers in felony and misdemeanor cases is 15,000 - 20,000. . . . [Tihe
lawyer manpower presently in the field meets less than half the estimated need."' 9 This aspect of the "magnitude" explanation, then,
frankly questions the ability of the legal system to accommodate an
eightfold increase in the demand for appointed counsel.'
The magnitude explanation seems to me also to have other, less
apparent aspects. The first involves the relationship between the right
to counsel at trial and the right to counsel at other stages of the criminal process. The second examines the impact of evolving concepts of
the nature and scope of government's obligation to the indigent accused. Finally, and most speculatively, it is worth considering whether
the recalcitrance of the right does not reflect an irrational reaction to
what Judge Friendly has called "the Bill of Rights as a code of
16
criminal procedure.'1 '
The expansion of the right to counsel in the post-Gideon period is
" See text, supra at notes 33-41.
" 1 SILVERSTEIN 123; Report of the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of
Criminal Law, 41 F.RtD. 389, 392 (1966).
1 SILVERSTEIN 125.
"' Id. at 9.
Report of the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Criminal Law, 41
F.R.D. 389, 393-94 (1966).
"oSee notes 101, 103, supra.
...
Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L.
REV. 929 (1965).
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remarkable both in scope and direction. Previously the right had
served primarily as a mechanism for assuring the reliability of formal
determinations of criminal guilt. In recent years, however, the right
to counsel has been pressed into service in the protection of a variety
of other interests. In the attempt to impose constitutional limitations
on official interrogation and other investigatory practices,162 the Court
has relied heavily, though not exclusively, on the right to counsel.
And while these new applications of the right serve in part the traditional goal of assuring reliable determinations of guilt and innocence,
it is clear that this effect, though not peripheral, is not essential to the
existence of the right. 6 ' Since Gideon, the right to counsel has come
to include not merely the right to a courtroom champion but also the
right to be free from surreptitious and "inherently compelling" interrogation by government officials and the right to resist or later effectively challenge unfair identification procedures, as well as a right to
post-conviction counsel on appeal and at probation revocation proceedings.
The suggestion made here is that the expanded scope and new
direction of the post-Gideon right to counsel seriously aggravates the
perceived gravity of the magnitude issue. In short, nonrecognition of
the indigent misdemeanant's right to counsel at trial also serves to
avert recognition of the misdemeanant's right to pretrial and postconviction counsel.
The same effect may also be ascribed to the evolution in recent
years of a more expansive conception of the indigent's need for legal
services. The government's obligation can no longer be discharged
simply by providing the indigent with an attorney. He is entitled to
adequate defense services, which, in a given case, may also include the
services of investigators, expert witnesses and other non-counsel
services.'64 As with the rights to pretrial and post-conviction counsel,
the right to non-counsel services is commonly conceived of as logically
dependent upon recognition of the misdemeanant's right to counsel at
trial.
Thus, although according to conventional analogical analysis the
post-Gideon right to counsel cases would support extension of the
"c'See text, supranotes 3-7.

" Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 299 (1967).
"' Katnisar & Choper, supra note 101, at 8; Note, Right to Aid in Addition to

Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 Mixx. L. REv. 1054 (1963);

REPoRT39-40 (1963).
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right to indigent misdemeanants, it is arguable that, on this practical
level, their effect has been to retard that extension.
A final suggested explanation may be worth airing. It is related to
the preceding explanations based on the magnitude of the misdemeanant's need, but it proceeds from a more speculative base. Is it
too far-fetched to suggest that the misdemeanant l'as been denied the
right to counsel he seems, on doctrinal and policy grounds, so eminently to deserve in irrational reprisal against the pressures exerted
on the criminal justice system by the Court's promulgation, largely
during this decade, of a "constitutional code of criminal procedure?"1" 5
While the cases surely do not all go in one direction, and while many
are designed to assure the system's reliability, the official criminal
process now more clearly resembles, to use Packer's simile, an "obstacle course"" 6' than it did in the pre-Mapp era. And the effect of each
obstacle, whether or not reliability-based, is, viewed from an enforcement perspective, to immunize from conviction persons deemed to be
'167
administratively "guilty.
To those for whom the ability of the system efficiently to convict
"guilty" persons outweighs the interests protected by denying convictions where improper procedures are used-a group that undoubtedly
includes a fair number of law-makers-counsel for the misdemeanant
may appear to be just another "obstacle." Such opposition would be
irrational-since elementary fairness and reliability and thus, in these
terms, efficiency, would seem to depend upon provision of counselbut it would not be incoherent. What I am here tentatively suggesting,
in other words, is that the criminal justice system has a fairly low tolerance for excluding from conviction persons presumed, as an administrative matter, to be "guilty."1'68 If, as a result of exclusions based
on violations of recently enlarged fourth and fifth amendment rights,
that level has, at least temporarily, been reached, it may tend to explain the recalcitrance of the misdemeanant's right to counsel.
"Friendly, supra note 161.
Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 13 (1964).
Id. at 11-13.
"The problem is not a new one.
It is one instance of a miserable set of irrational compromises, which, under
pretence of being practical expedients, produce almost all the practical hardships
and defects with which the law can be justly reproached. Abuses are constantly
defended, more or less consciously, on the ground that the hardships imposed on
the innocent may, as it were, be set off against the chances of escape held out to
the guilty.... So one of the commonest arguments against allowing prisoners to
be defended by counsel always was, that rogues had too many chances of escape
already.
STEPHEN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 174-75 (1863).
"

J.
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APPENDIX
THnE MISDEiEANANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
A m uA STATE COURTS

This appendix describes the present status of the indigent misdemeanant's right to appointed counsel both in law and, so far as can
be determined, in fact. Such a survey promises significant dividends.
Clearly a reasoned response to the questions whether and to what
extent the law ought to recognize the indigent's right to counsel in
misdemeanor' proceedings should begin with a relatively firm understanding of the extent to which that right is already recognized. The
significance of such data in the evolution of constitutional rights is
well established. 6 ' And there is reason to believe that such data are
more likely to be decisive in the present context than might be true in
other areas of constitutional adjudication. The critical issues involved
in fashioning a right to counsel in misdemeanor cases are not so much
doctrinal as practical. Can the states realistically meet the demand
for legal services that would be imposed upon them by recognition of
the right? If extension of the right to all misdemeanor proceedings
appears beyond society's present capabilities, are there principled
ways to contain the right within manageable proportions? Present
state practices vary from outright rejection to apparently unqualified
acceptance of the indigent misdemeanant's right to counsel, with the
fast majority of the states occupying positions somewhere between
these poles, providing, at least potentially, a rich source of experience
from which future constitutional policy may be derived. 7 °
A. Three PreliminaryViews
For an initial view of the law and practice it may be useful temporarily to obscure all but the most obvious differences among the juris' See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961) ; In re Gault 387 U.S. 1, 37-41
(1967); Kadish, Methodology and Criteriain Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism,66 YALE L.J. 319, 330-33 (1957).
' A pervasive problem encountered in attempting to discover and describe the
extent of the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases derives from the fact that the
meaning of the term "misdemeanor" varies substantially from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See, e.g., Patterson v. State, 227 Md. 194, 175 A.2d 746 (1961), rev'd per
curiam, 372 U.S. 776 (1963) discussed supra, note 32; Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386
U.S. 213, 217 n.3 (1967) ; N.J. STAT. Ax. §§ 2A:85-1 to -12 (1953). For purposes of
this paper the term will be operationally defined to include any criminal offense for
which the maximum sentence imposable on conviction is not more than one year's
imprisonment. This standard reflects the position that now obtains in general in
most jurisdictions. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 1.05 Comment at 7 (Tent. Draft No. 2
1954); 1 SuvERsmm 123.
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dictions. On this view, one can identify the polar extremes, consisting
of California,'7 1 the only jurisdiction in which indigent misdemeanants
appear without exception to be entitled to the appointment of counsel,
and, at the other extreme, Arkansas, 7 ' Florida, 17 ' Louisana 1 4 and
Ohio, in which the misdemeanant's right to counsel has been unequivocally rejected by judicial or legislative action. All the remaining
jurisdictions lie between these poles.
That only four jurisdictions have rejected the misdemeanant's claim
to counsel is a significant fact. Taking the "consumer's" view, 17 however, it can make little difference to an indigent person whether his
lack of counsel derives from affirmatively declared policy or from the
failure of the courts and legislature to recognize and implement a
right to counsel. From the "consumer's" view, the no-counsel position
gains several additional jurisdictions: Alabama ,'7 Alaska, 7 ' HaAnother difficulty warranting preliminary discussion derives from the fact that
the right to appointed counsel has both a legal and a factual dimension. In some
jurisdictions, for example, the stated law would seem to compel or at least allow the
appointment of counsel in some misdemeanor cases, whereas in fact such appointments are rarely or never made. Compare S.D. CODE §34.1901 (Supp. 1960) w'ith
3 DEFENSE OF THE POOR 676 (L. Silverstein ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as 3 SILVERSTEIN]. More commonly, the opposite is true: whereas the legal standard is by its
terms restricted to felony cases, in fact appointments are often made in certain
classes of misdemeanor cases. Compare ORE. REV. STAT. § 133.625 (Supp. 1967)
'ith 3 SILVERSTEIN 625; But cf. ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 135.320 -.330 (Supp. 1967).
This tension between the legal and factual right to counsel, while undoubtedly an
accurate reflection of the present uncertain state of the right, greatly complicates
the attempt to describe its present status. Accordingly, I have attempted at all times
to be clear about which dimension of the right is being discussed, and, where to do
so seemed more likely to illuminate than to distort the presentation, I have explicitly
adopted conventions for dealing with recurring situations. For example, in determining the existence and extent of the legal right to counsel in misdemeanor cases,
pre-Gideon judicial decisions have been ignored unless the right was, to some extent, recognized. The refusal to recognize the misdemeanant's right during that
period follows a fortiori from Betts v. Brady, and it seems quite inaccurate now to
say that such jurisdictions have rejected the right. On the factual side, a distinction
is drawn between systematic provision of counsel, to a greater or lesser extent, in
misdemeanor proceedings, and the casual or episodic provision of counsel in some
cases or, more usually, in some parts of the jurisdiction.
"' See text infra at notes 269-75.
"'ARK. STAT. AN-. §43-1203 (1964); Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151. 387 S.W.2d
364 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907 (1966) ; Kirkwood v. State, 199 Ark. 879, 136
S.W.2d 174 (1940) ; 2 DEFENSE OF THE POOR 49 (L. Silverstein ed. 1965) [hereinafter
cited as 2 SILVERSTEIN].
"7See text infra at notes 189-97.
17'LA. CRI-I. PRO. CODE ANN. art. 513 (West 1966) : "This article continues the
Louisiana policy of limiting state-provided counsel to felony cases." Comment to
art. 513.
"75OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2941.50 (Supp. 1966); Toledo v. Frazier, 10 Ohio
App. 2d 51, 226 N.E.2d 777 (1967) ; cf. 3 SILVERSTEIN 585, 592.
'7' Cahn, Law in the Consumer Perspective, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1963).
ALA. CODE tit. 15 §§ 318(1)-(2) (Supp. 1965) ; Martin v. State, 277 Ala. 153,
167 So. 2d 912 (1964) ; 2 SILVERSTEIN 2; but see Irvin v. State, 203 So. 2d 283 (Ala.
App. 1967).
"'ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 39; 2 SILVERSTEIN- 20; cf. Knudsen v. Anchorage, 358
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waii, 1'7 9 Mississippi,8 0 South Carolina,' 81 Tennessee"" and Virginia."'
These states, plus, of course, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana and Ohio,
recognize no right to counsel in any misdemeanor proceeding. Nor, so
far as one can discover, are counsel ever in fact appointed for misdemeanants in these jurisdictions. Thirty-nine jurisdictions either recognize a right to, or in fact appoint, counsel in some misdemeanor
cases. California remains the only full-counsel jurisdiction. This second general view, however, also obscures more than it illuminates,
since it includes within the middle, "limited-counsel", category jurisdictions that more nearly resemble one or the other polar extreme than
one another.
Two adjustments will provide a more useful third view of the present law and practice. Jurisdictions in which counsel are in fact appointed not according to a statewide system for providing such services
but only casually or locally will be included in the no-counsel category.
Jurisdictions that provide counsel for misdemeanants in all but traffic
or other minor, essentially non-criminal proceedings will be categorized
as full-counsel states.
On this third view, both polar categories are enlarged at the expense
of the middle group. Twenty-one jurisdictions'8" recognize no right to
85
although
appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases, as herein defined,
casual or local appointments may in fact be made. Seven jurisdictions'8 6 provide counsel for indigents in all or substantially all misdemeanor proceedings. Counsel are systematically provided187in some
misdemeanor cases in the remaining twenty-two jurisdictions.
Although still obscuring rather substantial variations in practice,
this third view provides a reasonably accurate general outline of the
P.2d 375 (Alaska 1960). A bill providing for appointment of counsel in misdeto pass.
meanor cases, reproduced in 2 SILVERSTEIN at 30, apparently failed Hawaii
Sess. Laws;
' HAwAII REV. LAws § 253-5, as amended Act 179, [1967]
2 SILVERSTEIN 176.
" MIss. CODE ANN. § 2505 (1956); 2 SILVERSTEIN 404.
'S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-507 (1962); Pitt v. MacDougall, 245 S.C. 98, 138 S.E.
2d 840 (1964) ; cf. 3 SILVERSTEIN 666.
" TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2014-2028 (Supp. 1966).
(1960); Manson, The Indigent in Virginia,
' VA. CODE ANN. §19.1-241.1
51 VA. L. REv. 163 (1965); 3 SILVERSTEIN.756.
Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Kentucky,
"Alabama,
Louisiana, Missouri, Mississippi, New Mexico, Nebraska, Ohio, Rhode Island,
S. Carolina, S. Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington and Wyoming.
note 170, supra.
'See
"California, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Texas and
Minnesota.
2"Arizona,

Colorado,

Connecticut,

Delaware,

Idaho,

Indiana,

Iowa,

Maine,

Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, N. Carolina, N. Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
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current status of the misdemeanant's right to counsel in American
courts. Only a few states recognize such a right without major qualifications. A substantial number of jurisdictions have gone beyond the
facts of Gideon although not so far as its rhetoric 8" would lead them.
A nearly equal number of jurisdictions, representing most sections of
the country (but over-representing the South), appoint counsel only in
felony cases, with insubstantial exceptions. Within these broad
classes, of course, exist substantial, and sometimes instructive, variations in doctrine and practice, to which we now turn.
B. No-Counsel Jurisdictions
As we have seen, the hard core no-counsel states are those in which
the right has been considered and expressly rejected. Florida is typical. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon, the Florida
Legislature enacted legislation setting up a public defender, charged
with the duty of representing "any person . . .charged with a noncapital felony.... " 1" In 1963 the Attorney General officially opined
that the public defender's duties were limited to noncapital felony
cases. 9" The following year, 9 ' and twice since, ' 2 the Florida Supreme
Court has affirmed misdemeanor convictions challenged on the ground
that counsel had not been provided.
Until authoritatively determined to the contrary by the Supreme Court
of the United States, the rule in Florida is that there is no absolute
organic right to counsel in misdemeanor trials.' 93
It is ironic, and typical of the chaotic state of the law in this area,
that even in Florida, despite contrary official pronouncements by its
legislature, attorney general and supreme court, there is a legal and
perhaps a factual right to counsel in some misdemeanor cases. In
two federal habeas corpus cases the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit has held unconstitutional state misdemeanor convictions in which the defendant was not advised of his right to appointed counsel."9 4 The opposing federal-state lines are so clearly
'" 372

U.S. at 344.
,-FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.51 (1) (1966).
" FLA. Op. ATT'Y GEN,.463-90 (1963).
...
Fish v. State, 159 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1964).
112
Watkins v. Morris, 179 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1965) ; Florida ex rel. Taylor v.
Warden, 193 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1967).
"'Watkins v. Morris, 179 So. 2d 348, 349 (Fla. 1965).
"'See Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965); McDonald v. Moore,
353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965).
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drawn that the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, in a recent decision ordering the release of an indigent Florida
misdemeanant pursuant to Harvey-McDonald, also held that federal
habeas corpus would lie even though the petitioner had not exhausted
his state remedies, since it was clear from the Florida cases that he
could get no adequate relief in the state courts."9 5 The notion that the
Supreme Court could, by promulgating a uniform national rule in
Gideon reduce the opportunity for federal-state abrasion"9 6 seems not
to have stood the test of time.
Whether McDonald and Rutledge were retried with counsel is not
known. It is reported, however, that prior to the new public defender
legislation, public defender offices in Dade (Miami) and Hillsborough
(Tampa) Counties provided representation for indigent persons "for
the more serious and complicated misdemeanors."" ' Whether this
practice has survived Fish,Morris and Taylor is uncertain.
Apart from this example of neo-interposition, there is little to be
gained from further consideration of the law and practice in the hard
core states. None has attempted to provide a reasoned or principled
justification of its policy.'
While what they are saying is less than
"Never," it amounts to nothing more than "Not now."
The remaining no-counsel jurisdictions fall into two groups: (1)
those in which the right to appointed counsel is by statute expressly
limited to felony proceedings; and (2) those in which the governing
legal standard would appear to permit (if not compel) appointments
in some misdemeanor cases, but has never been so interpreted. Counsel may in fact be appointed in some misdemeanor cases in either set
of jurisdictions, but only on a casual or local basis.
In nine jurisdictions the power to appoint counsel for indigent persons is by statute restricted to felony cases. 9 With one exception,
"' Rutledge v. Miami, 267 F.Supp. 885 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
"Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349, 351 (1963) (Harlan, J.,concurring);
Junker, Book Review, 2 S.D.L. REv. 182, 185-86 (1965).
2 SILVMRSTEIN 147.

' The Arkansas Supreme Court's opinion in Winters occupies exactly one-half
page in the case reports. Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W.2d 364 (1965).
The combined opinions in Fish, Watkins and Taylor, supra notes 191-93, cover but
four pages of the Southern Reporter.

IHawaii:

HAAii

REV. LAWS §253-5, as amended Act 179, [1967] Hawaii

Sess. Laws; Mississippi: MIss. CoDE AiNN. § 2505 (1956); Missouri: Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 545-820 (1949); Nebraska: NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 29-1803.01, 29-1804 (Supp.
1965); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-1-1 (92), 41-11-2 (1965), cf. 3
SivFRsTsn 513-14; S. Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. §17-507 (1962); Tennessee:
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2014 to -2028 (Supp. 1966); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 19.1-241.1 (1960); Washington: WASH. REv. CODE § 10.01.110 (Supp. 1965), but
see WAsH. REV. CoDE § 10.40.030 (1957).
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the doctrinal differences among these "restrictive-rule" jurisdictions
are insubstantial. When the Washington statute was amended in 1965,
the legislature added a proviso extending the right to appointed counsel to all "other proceedings . . . as may be constitutionally required. '2 °" The question whether an indigent misdemeanant has a
constitutional right to counsel, and thus, it would follow, to appointed
counsel under the statute is presently pending before the Washington
Supreme Court.20 ' Doctrinal developments have not all been in the
same direction, however. Prior to 1965, the Tennessee Code appeared
to extend the right to counsel to persons "accused of any crime or
misdemeanor whatsoever. ' 20 2 Legislation enacted in 1965, however,
expressly limits the right to appointed counsel to persons charged
with felonies. 0 3
As a matter of practice, reports from six restrictive-statute jurisdictions indicate that counsel are rarely if ever appointed for misdemeanants; 204 in the remaining three counsel are appointed in some
"serious" misdemeanor cases,- or in some localities. 00
While the existence of a factual as well as a legal dimension to the
right to appointed counsel may make efforts at description more difficult, it serves also as an aid to accurate description by providing a contemporaneous de facto interpretation of an otherwise ambiguous
standard. This is especially significant with respect to the remaining
no-counsel jurisdictions. In these eight jurisdictions the statutory
standard would appear to permit the appointment of counsel in some
or all misdemeanor proceedings. 0 7 Lacking an authoritative judicial
interpretation of such standards, as is the case with respect to nearly
all of the "permissive-statute" jurisdictions, one could only assume
(wrongly, it turns out) that the practice conformed to a reasonable
construction of the standard. In truth, the characteristic common to
'WASH. REV. CODE § 10.01.110 (Supp. 1965).
="Seattle v. Hendrix, No. 38357, Wash. Supreme Court (filed 1/11/67) (set for
reargument on 5/10/68).
.TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2002 to -2003 (1955).
"' TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-2014 to -2028 (Supp. 1966).
' HAWAII:
cf. 2 SILVERSTEIN 176; Mississippi: 2 SILVERSTEIN 404-05; Missouri: 3 SILVERSTEIN 414; S. Carolina: cf. 3 SILVERSTEIN 666; Tennessee: 3 SILVERSTEIN 689, 692; Virginia: 3 SILVERSTEIN 756-57.
' Nebraska: 3 SILVERSTEIN 440; Washington: 3 SILVERSTEIN 772.
Ohio: 3 SILVERSTEIN 583, 585; Nebraska: 3 SILVERSTEIN 440.
'ALA. CODE tit. 15 §§318 (1)-(2) (Supp. 1965); ALASKA R. CRIAX. P. 39;
GA. CONST. art. I, § 2-105, but see Taylor v. City of Griffin, 113 Ga. App. 589, 149
S.E.2d 177 (1966) (dictum) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1304 (1964); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. 453.190 (1963); but see Ky. R. CRIM. P. 8.04 and Wright v. Crawford, 401
S.W.2d 47 (Ky. 1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-15-3 (1956); S.D. CODE 34.1901
(Supp. 1960) ; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-7 (1957), Id. § 7-9 (Supp. 1967).
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most of the permissive-statute jurisdictions is that counsel are never
or only rarely appointed in misdemeanor cases, 0 8 as that term is defined herein. In only three are counsel appointed even on a casual or
local basis.& 09
The statutory standards in the no-counsel jurisdictions that have
permissive statutes range from Alabama's "serious offense" 0 standard
to South Dakota's statute providing for assigned counsel in "any
criminal action."2 1' The irrelevance of this legal dimension of the right
to counsel in no-counsel jurisdictions is probably best illustrated by
the fact that an indigent misdemeanant is about as likely to obtain
appointed counsel in a jurisdiction in which the legal right is limited
to felonies than in one in which the right at least arguably extends
to his case. 1
Nor are the statutory standards-whether restrictive or permissive
-of any particular political relevance. With one uncertain exception,
the legal standards are not hard-won prizes resulting from legislative
confrontation of the difficult ideological, fiscal and doctrinal issues the
question calls for; they are simply artifacts of an earlier constitutional
era. Washington's post-Gideon statute is the possible exception. Like
Wisconsin's contemporaneous enactment 13 and the 1967 amendment
to the New Jersey rule, 214 the Washington statute extends the right
to appointed counsel to "such other proceedings . . .as may be constitutionally required. ' 215 Outsiders can only speculate whether these
responses represent abdication of the duty to provide standards by
statute or court rule, or, more charitably, a realistic recognition of the
expanding scope of the right to counsel, or simply the best temporary
compromise between libertarian and logistic pressures. In any event,
by begging the policy question, they offer no aid in the quest for
rational constitutional standards.
C. Limited Counsel Jurisdictions
By a narrow margin, the dominant postion among the states rejects
the felony-misdemeanor distinction and provides counsel on a syste'Alabama: 2 SiLVERSTEIN 3; Alaska: 2 SILVERSTEIN 20; Kansas: 2 SILVERSTEIN
254-55; Rhode Island: 3 SILVERSTEIN 656; S. Dakota; 3 SILVERSTEIN 676-77.
' Georgia: 2 SIVERSTEn
164; Kentucky: 2 SILVERSTEIN 270; Wyoming: 3
SILVERSTEIN 818.
21 ALA. CODE tit. 15 §§ 318(1)-(2) (Supp. 1965).
S.D. CoDE § 34.1901 (Supp. 1960).
Compare notes 205-06 with note 209, mspra.
3
" Wis. STAT. ANN. § 957.26 (Supp. 1967).
21
N.J.R.
1:12-9.
C
WASH. REV.
CODE § 10.01.110 (Supp.1965).
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matic basis for some but not all indigent misdemeanants. The standards by which the line is drawn between those misdemeanants who are
entitled to appointed counsel and those who are not fall into four
categories: (I) those that leave the decision to the discretion of the
trial court;216 (2) those that require appointment of counsel where the
penalty imposable on conviction falls within fixed limits; 217 (3) combining the foregoing, those that allow the trial court to exercise its
discretion to appoint counsel where the possible penalty falls within
fixed limits; 218 and (4) a residual category of standards that are presently unsettled, although fairly clearly recognizing some right to ap21
pointed counsel in misdemeanor cases. 1
1. DiscretionaryStandards
No doubt even a hard core no-counsel jurisdiction would, in a given
case, recognize the power of the judiciary to appoint a member of the
bar to represent an indigent misdemeanant. In this sense, the limitedcounsel jurisdictions that leave such appointments to the discretion of
the trial court are not so far different from no-counsel jurisdictions.
Certainly the difference does not lie in the statement of the power
granted, which conventionally provides that the court "may7 22 0 or "in
the interest of justice"12- 21 may appoint counsel in misdemeanor cases.
The difference between the no-counsel jurisdiction that may concede
judicial power to appoint counsel in non-felony cases and the limitedcounsel jurisdictions under consideration is probably best expressed
in terms of the predictable legal consequences of a failure to exercise
that power. Whereas in the former case the aggrieved misdemeanant
would have no remedy, in a limited-counsel jurisdiction the court's
failure or refusal to appoint counsel would be subject to the usual
rules governing abuse of discretion.
Of more practical importance, of course, is the manner in which the
discretion to appoint counsel is ordinarily exercised. Obviously, a
limited-counsel jurisdiction in which the courts did not routinely pass
on the question whether to appoint counsel for misdemeanor defendants would be practically indistinguishable from a no-counsel jurisdiction. In Connecticut and North Carolina, for example, the power
" Colorado, Connecticut, Maine, N. Carolina and Vermont.
2" Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, and Utah.
"'Delaware, Maryland, Montana and W. Virginia.
" Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, New Jersey, N. Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.
'E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-21-3(2) (a) (1963) ; COLO. R. CRIA. P. 44;
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-4.1 (1965).
'CoNx. GE-N. STAT. ANY. § 54-81(a)(1958).
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appears to be quite sparingly used. Indeed, only inconclusive dicta
support the proposition that counsel are ever appointed in misdemeanor cases (as herein defined) in either jurisdiction.2 2
3

2

Moreover,

4

in both Connecticut? and North Carolina
the state courts have
affirmed discretionary denials of appointed counsel in cases involving
possible one-year sentences. Arguably, therefore, such jurisdictions
might more accurately be considered jurisdictions in which counsel is
not provided in misdemeanor cases. The same might also be said of
the remaining "discretionary" jurisdictions-Colorado, 22 5 Maine 2 and
VermontL 27 The latter states are distinguishable from Connecticut
and North Carolina only by the absence of case law sactioning the
denial of counsel in misdemeanor cases. At the same time, there is no
case law affirmatively commanding discretionary appointments or even
that such discretion be exercised. Whether attorneys are provided for
indigent misdemeanants in any of these jurisdictions is thus not a
legal but a factual question. Current reports of actual practice are
not available, however, and recent changes in the applicable laws
of all of these jurisdictions have made obsolete what data have been
collected. In the absence of current studies of the practices in these
jurisdictions, the least misleading course is simply to parrot the usual
statutory formula: an attorney "may" be assigned to represent an
indigent misdemeanant.
2. Limited DiscretionStandards
A similarly unsatisfactory conclusion must be reached with respect
to two of the four jurisdictions that authorize appointments within
fixed limits. Montana's new code of criminal procedure, effective January 1, 1968, empowers "courts of record" to appoint counsel for
indigent misdemeanants "in the interest of justice." 2 It is, of course,
too soon to know whether this power will be exercised in such a way
as to provide a meaningful right to counsel in misdemeanor prosecutions punishable by imprisonment for one year or less. It is clear
State v. DeJoseph, 3 Conn. Cir. 624, 222 A.2d 752, 759, cert. denied, 385 U.S.
982 (1966); State v. Hayes, 261 N.C. 648, 135 S.E.-d 653, 654, (1964); State v.
Bennett, 266 N.C. 755, 147 S.F2d 237, (1966); State v. Sherron, 268 N.C. 694,
151 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1966).
Arbo v. Hegstrom, 261 F. Supp. 397 (D. Conn. 1966) (habeas corpus granted.)
Creighton v. State, 257 F. Supp. 806 (E.D.N.C. 1966) (habeas corpus denied).
COLO.REv. STAT. ANx. § 39-21-3 (2) (a) (1963).
-'ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 15, § 810 (Supp. 1967).
'VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6503 (Supp. 1967) constrted in It re Mears, 124 Vt
131, 198 A.2d 27 (1964) ; see VT. STAT. ANN. tit 13, § 6506 (1959).
1MoNT. RFv.CoDES ANN. § 95-1001(4) (Supp. 1968).
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that counsel will not be appointed for misdemeanors punishable by
not more than six months' imprisonment, since such cases are not
ordinarily tried in a "court of record. ' 22 9 Thus, by restricting the
application to particular courts, the statute also fixes imprisonment
for more than six months as the floor of the discretionary right to
appointed counsel. A similar result is reached in West Virginia by
excluding from the operation of the appointment statute "traffic viola2 -30
tions and violations of municipal ordinances.
A quite different route leads to the inclusion of Delaware as a hybrid
"limited discretion" jurisdiction. Unlike discretionary jurisdictions
already considered, in which the power to appoint was clear but its
exercise uncertain, in Delaware (prior to the enactment of public defender legislation in 1964)231 the power was uncertain but in practice
the courts generally assigned counsel in any misdemeanor case tried
in superior court that might "result in imprisonment for more than
' 232
three months.
Maryland law illustrates yet another variation on the limited discretion theme. Counsel must be appointed when the offense is one
"for which the maximum punishment is ...imprisonment for a period
of six months or more," and "may" be assigned in cases involving
lesser penalties.233
In summary, of the nine limited-counsel jurisdictions that rest the
power to appoint counsel in the discretion of the trial court (whether
or not exercisable only within fixed limits), only two may be confidently put down as jurisdictions in which indigent misdemeanants are
actually represented on a systematic basis. Illustrating the two-dimensional nature of the right, it is noteworthy that with respect to Delaware this confidence derives from factual data,234 while as to Maryland
it results from the nature of the legal standard.
3. Fixed Standards
The line between jurisdictions that apply discretionary and those
that apply fixed standards is not sharp. Arizona provides the marginal
case. Indigent misdemeanants are entitled to appointed counsel in any
MONT. CONST. art. VIII, §25; MONT. REV. CODE ANN.
(Supp. 1968) 11-1602 to -1603, -1702 (1947).
W. VA. CODE § 62-3-1 (1966).
" DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, §§ 4601-4607 (Supp. 1966).

§§95-301

to -303

1'2 SILVERSTEIN 122.

MTn. R. PROc. 719 (b) (2) (Supp. 1967); Manning v. State 237 Md. 349, 206 A.2d
563 (1965).
"'See note 232 supra.

1968]

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

prosecution that involves a "serious offense.""2 35 If, as is true under

Idaho's recent legislation, that term were authoritatively defined to
include any offense "the penalty for which includes the possibility of
confinement for more than six months, 2 3 6 the scope of the right would
be clearly "fixed." If, on the other hand, trial courts may determine
"9seriousness" on an ad hoc basis, it is just as clear that the power is
discretionary. Arizona law falls between these examples. The Arizona
Supreme Court is apparently willing to give concrete meaning to the
"serious offense" standard, but thus far has not done so. It seems
likely, however, that the line will be drawn to exclude cases punishable
237
by less than six months' imprisonment.
Two other jurisdictions, Utah2 3 and Nevada,239 also limit the misdemeanant's right to counsel to cases in which the punishment imposable on conviction exceeds six months imprisonment. Nevada law accomplishes this by requiring representation in "gross misdemeanor"
prosecutions.
4. Unsettled Standards
The nine remaining limited-counsel jurisdictions2 40 are ones in which
some misdemeanants are undoubtedly entitled to and in fact receive
appointed counsel, but in which the scope of the right is at present uncertain or unsettled. The situation in Wisconsin is illustrative. Before
its amendment in 1965,241 the relevant Wisconsin statute authorized
the appointment of counsel only in felony cases. Empirical studies
showed, however, that counsel were in fact appointed for some misdemeanants although the "practices . . . vary widely across the

state."24 Despite the assertion that one could arguably find "a right
243
to appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases under Wisconsin law"
during that period, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had gone no further
than to recognize the right with respect to a "felony-type" misdemeanor 24 4-- a result clearly commanded by Patterson but of no great
significance with respect to "misdemeanors" as herein defined. The
State v. Anderson; 96 Ariz. 123, 392 P.2d 784, 790 (1964).
Ch. 181, [1967] Idaho Sess. Laws.
'See State v. Betts, 2 Ariz. App. 27, 406 P.2d 229, 233 (1965).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-64-2 (Supp. 1967).
NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 171.370, 193.120, 193.140 (1963).
"Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, New Jersey, N. Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.
I Wis. STAT. Axn-i. § 957-26 (Supp. 1967).
'Winters, Counsel for the Indigent Accused it Wisconsin, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 1,
25 (1965).
mMId. at 24.
" State ex rel. Barth v. Burke, 24 Wis. 2d 82, 128 N.W.2d 422, 424 (1964)
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legislative responses to these practical and doctrinal developments
appears to have been one of complete neutrality. Under the 1965
amendment counsel must be appointed "in any case where required
by the United States or Wisconsin constitution. ' 24 ' The amended
statute is neutral in the sense that it signals a legislative withdrawal
from the fray-the issue becomes wholly constitutional, that is to say,
in the absence of constitutional amendment, wholly judicial. But the
legislature has not only withdrawn, it has also withdrawn the "felony"
standard that existed prior to 1965. In this sense, the amendment is
not neutral but rather a decided endorsement of at least a limited
right to counsel in misdemeanor cases. Thus, despite the fact that the
statute begs the question, the cases are inclusive and the practice
irregular, in combination these factors provide more support for the
inference that some indigent misdemeanants are entitled to counsel in
Wisconsin than for the opposite conclusion, even thought the scope of
that right is far from settled at the present time.
As we have seen, the scope of the right to counsel in misdemeanor
cases may be described in a variety of ways: by reference to certain
classes of offenses, or to the penalty imposable on conviction (which
often but not always amounts to the same thing), or to the jurisdiction
of particular courts, or to the source (whether state or local) of the
law offended against, to name the most commonly used devices. Most
of these descriptive devices can be translated, with more or less difficulty, into common analytical terms-here, the maximum period of
imprisonment imposable on conviction. Where such translation cannot
be made, it has been necessary to conclude that the scope of the right
is uncertain. With a regularity that invites suspicion, such has been
the case with the concept of "indictable" offenses. Accordingly, those
jurisdictions that apply this standard-Iowa, 2-4 New Jersey,2 47 Oregon 24 and Pennsylvania 24 9-are here treated as "uncertain." "Indic(Defendant sentenced to five consecutive one-year sentences on plea of guilty to 19
counts of issuing worthless checks.)
" WIS. STAT. A xx. § 957.26 (Supp. 1967).
2" IOWA CODE Ax-. § 775.4 (1950); 2 SILVERSTEIN 240; cf. Weaver v. Herrick,-Iowa-, 140 N.W.2d 178 (1966) ; State v. Gruver,--Iowa-, 148 N.W.2d
405 (1967) ; IOWA Op. ATT'Y GEN. Oct. 20, 1966.
2'7N.J. STAT. ANN. §§2A:158A-1 to -22 (Supp. 1967); N.J.R.R. 1:12-9 (Supp.

1967) ; see In re Garofone, 42 N.J. 244, 200 A.2d 101, 102 (1964) (question reserved)
but cf. State v. Zucconi, 93 N.J. Super. 380, 226 A.2d 16 (1967).
"ORE.
REV. STAT. § 133.625 (Supp. 1967); 3 SILVERSTEIN 625; but see ORE. REV.
STAT. §§ 133.635, 135.320-.330 (Supp. 1967); cf. State v. Blank,-Ore.-, 405 P.2d
373, 374 (1965) (dictum); but cf. Gebhart v. Gladden,-Ore.-, 412 P.2d 29, 32
(1966).
""PA. R. CRIM. P. 318; 3 SILVERSTEITN 637-39; see Commonwealth ex rel. Firmstone v. Myers, 202 Pa. Super. 292, 196 A.2d 209 (1963).
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table" clearly includes some misdemeanor offenses; indeed, in Iowa
and Oregon the standard is "indictable" misdemeanors. As to precisely which misdemeanor offenses are included within the term "indictable," however, I confess to have found "the amount of illumination
[to be] in inverse ratio to the effort of inquiry." 25
Indiana law on this subject is unique in that it derives wholly from
the state constitution, unaided by the kind of supporting legislation
that has been enacted with increasing frequency around the country
in recent years. Nearly every state constitution includes a provision
generally recognizing the "right to assistance of counsel." 25 ' Contrary
to experience under the sixth amendment, however, these provisions
seem to have been singularly irrelevant to the development of the
indigent's right to appointed counsel. Indiana is among the exceptions,
its supreme court having held in 1951 that the right was "self-executing and does not depend upon legislative authority." 252 The uncertainty as to the indigent misdemeanant's right to appointed counsel in
Indiana, as in Oklahoma,2 5 derives not from the governing legal standard but from its administration. In both jurisdictions the right to
appointed counsel was relatively early applied to misdemeanor cases.
Yet in neither jurisdiction is counsel in fact systematically appointed
for misdemeanants, according to empirical studies" 4 conducted several
years after adoption of a standard that would appear unambiguously
to include them. Hence their inclusion here as "uncertain" jurisdictions.
North Dakota law is in a somewhat similar state. A 1967 amendment of the governing statute empowers magistrates to appoint counsel
for any "defendant charged with a violation of state criminal law."2 55
In the absence of any substantial experience regarding the use of this
new power, however, no verdict but "unsettled" seems justified at the
present time.
In Michigan, the last of the unsettled limited-counsel jurisdictions,
the issue of the scope of the misdemeanant's right to appointed counsel
'
§22.

Allen, The Nature of a Crime, 13 J. Comm. LEG. & INT'L L. (3d ser. 1931).
E.g., N.J. CONST. art. I, § 10; MmN. CONST. art. I, § 6; WASH. CONST. art. I,

"Balkovac

v. State, 229 Ind- 294, 98 N.E2d 250, 255 (1951)

(construing IND.

I, § 13).
'Hunter v. State, 288 P.2d 425 (Okla. Crim. 1965); I re Cannon, 351 P.2d 756
(Okla. Crim. 1960); but see, OiA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §464, cf. Id. tit. 19 §§ 138.1-.5

CONST. art.

(Supp. 1967).
Indiana: 2 SILvERSTEN 217; Oklahoma: 3 SILVERSTEN 621.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-07-01.1 (Supp. 1967). Practices under prior law varied
from county to county. 3 SrrvEsTnr 574-75.
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produced a four-way split among the justices of the supreme court. 6
The indigent misdemeanant came away with a right to appointed counsel on appeal from any conviction under state law and an uncertain
right to appointed counsel at trial. Viewed against the national situation, the compass of the dispute remaining after Mallory is relatively
narrow: whether to provide counsel for misdemeanants subject to
imprisonment for ninety days or more or, following the federal "petty
offense" model, -37 to restrict the right to indigent persons in jeopardy
of imprisonment for a period in excess of six months. Since the narrow
issue in Mallory was the right to appelate counsel, and since the
Michigan Supreme Court's rule adopting the ninety-day standard 25
has been withdrawn 25 9 "unsettled" would appear to be the only accurate characterization of Michigan law, even though the scope of the
uncertainty is comparatively narrow.
D.

Full-CounselJurisdictions

With respect to no jurisdiction can it be said that counsel are appointed for indigent defendants in every misdemeanor proceeding. So
far as I have been able to discover, every jurisdiction (with the potential exception of California) excludes from coverage some classes of
misdemeanor offenses. What distinguishes the jurisdictions now to be
considered from other limited-counsel jurisdictions is the judgment
that the classes excluded are of minor significance.
For a short period, New York law appeared to guarantee a right to
appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases without exception. In People
v. Witenski6- ' three youths were convicted by a justice of the peace
of stealing about two dollars' worth of apples from an orchard and
sentenced to imprisonment for thirty days and to pay a fine of 25
dollars.26 1
By a four-three vote the court of appeals reversed on the ground
that the defendants had not been informed of their right to assigned
counsel. Sweeping aside statutory provisions that arguably limited the
right to more serious cases, the majority held that the right to counsel
"cannot be and in this State is not restricted to major crime," but
People v. Mallory, 378 Mich. 538, 147 N.W.2d 66 (1967).
' Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
'MICH.
ST. B.J., Jan., 1967 at 37.
MicH. ST. B.J., May, 1967 at 21.
15 N.Y.2d 392, 207 N.E.2d 358, 259 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1965).
' Since none could pay the fine, the effective sentence was 55 days' imprisonment, reduced on appeal to the county court to the time then served-about seven days.
207 N.E.2d at 359, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
27
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rather applied "in every criminal case, large or small. ' 262
The reaction was swift and not unpredictable. The state legislature
pointedly excluded "traffic infractions" from the scope of new legislation providing generally for the "representation of persons accused of
crime.""
In People v. Lettorio23 the court of appeals found no constitutional defect in this "most recent expression of the Legislature's
views on the right to counsel in traffic cases."2 65 Traffic infractions,
the majority reasoned, are "a form of misconduct distinguishable from
more serious breaches of the law . . . [and] the practical result of
assigning counsel to defendants in traffic cases would be chaotic."2'66
The two dissenting judges were less concerned with the nature of the
offense than that the traffic convictions under review had both resulted
in sentences of imprisonment.2 67 "[W]here imprisonment threatens,
constitutional guarantees as to counsel must apply to 'non-serious' as

well as 'serious' offenses.

'268

In New York, therefore, Witenski and Lettorio appear to command
that in non-traffic criminal cases, however trivial, counsel must be
appointed, while in traffic prosecutions, however serious, counsel need
not be appointed for the indigent defendant.
Although the scope of the misdemeanant's right to appointed counsel in California has not been tested against facts quite so extreme as
those in Witenski and Lettorio, the rhetoric of the cases would appear
to admit of no exceptions. In re Johnson 69 involved, as the California
Supreme Court later characterized it, "a young scofflaw [sentenced] to
900 days for repeated violations of the Vehicle Code. '2 70 Resting its
decision on the state constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel,2 71
it found the right "not limited to felony cases but.., equally guaranteed to persons charged with misdemeanors in a municipal or other
' 2 72
inferior court.
That the California court intended to give the right to counsel a
-2207

N.E.2d at 360-61, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 415, 417.

1 N.Y. CouNTY LAw §§ 722-722-f (McKinney Supp. 1967); N.Y. CODE
PROC. § 699 (McKinney Supp. 1967).

CMM.

16 N.Y.2d 307, 213 N.E2d 670, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1965).

213 N.E.2d at 671, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
213 N.E.2d at 672, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 371.

Lettorio: 42 days' imprisonment and $1,030 fine, or in default of payment, 135
additional days' imprisonment Kohler: 10 days' imprisonment and $100 fine, or in
default of payment, 30 additional days' imprisonment. 213 N.E.2d at 673, 674-75, 266

N.Y.S.2d at 368, 375.
213 N.F2d at 674, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 374.
2

62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1965).

Inre Smiley, 66 Cal. 2d 634, 427 P.2d 179, 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1967).
"' CAL.Co sT., art. I, § 13.
'In re Johnson, 62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 422, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1965).
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scope more consistent with the rhetoric than with the facts of the
Johnson case is suggested by its treatment of the "practical" problems
of administering the right within a system of mass-produced criminal
justice. Contrary to the chaos feared by the Lettorio majority, the
court felt that
...probably the vast majority of citizens hailed into court on traffic violations share the judge's interest in prompt disposition of their cases,
feeling themselves sufficiently inconvenienced
by having to make a per27 3
sonal appearance in the first place.
While it is true that, narrowly read, the California Supreme Court
decisions go no further than to affirm the indigent misdemeanant's
right to appointed counsel in circumstances involving substantial jail
sentences,274 no sound reason appears to justify preferring such a
narrow construction over the court's repeated insistence that "there
can be no doubt" that the right extends "to all persons . ..charged
'2 5
with a misdemeanor in a justice or other inferior court.
The five remaining full-counsel jurisdictions-Illinois ,271 Massachusetts,2 7 Minnesota, 278 New Hampshire' 9 and Texas28 -- all draw the
right-to-counsel line at the point at which the indigent misdemeanant's
liberty is Put in jeopardy. Despite variations in the source-statute,
case-law and court rule are all represented-and in the precise formulation of the standards, each of these jurisdictions extends the right to
appointed counsel to any indigent person charged with an offense
punishable by imprisonment. New Hampshire law appears to go farther,
including as well persons charged with offenses for which a fine in excess
of 500 dollars could be imposed,"' but it is uncertain whether any such
offense would not also be punishable by imprisonment.
-13398 P.2d at 427, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 235. See Blake v. Municipal Court, 242 Cal.
App. 2d 857, 51 Cal. Rptr. 771 (1966), applying Johnson to a case involving driving
a vehicle at a speed which endangers the safety of persons and property-punishable
by $50 fine or five days in jail-where defendant received a one day jail sentence.
'it
re Smiley, 66 Cal. 2d 634, 427 P.2d 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1967) involved
an "effective sentence" of 445 days' imprisonment.
- In re Smiley, 427 P.2d at 184, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
"ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 113-3(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); People v. Garret, 43 Ill. App. 2d 183, 193 N.E.2d 229 (1963) (dictum); People v. Fletcher, 74 I.
App. 2d 387, 220 N.E.2d 70 (1966) (abstract only published); but cf. ILL. S. CT.
RULES 605, 607, ILL. ANY. STAT. ch. 110A §§605, 607 (Smith-Hurd 1968).
'MAss.
SuP. JUD. CT. RULE 3:10 (1967); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 221, §34D
(Supp. 1966); Mulcahy v. Commonwealth,-Mass.-, 227 N.E.2d 326 (1967);
MacDonnel v. Commonwealth,-Mass.-, 230 N.E.2d 821 (1967).
" State v. Borst,-Minn.-, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967); State v. Collins,-Minn.-,
154 N.W.2d 688 (1967); State v. Jllingworth,-Minn.-, 154 N.W.2d 687 (1967).
"N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§604-A :1, :2 (Supp. 1967).
TEx. CODE CRJM. PRoc. art 26.04 (1966).
' N.H. REV. STAT.
,ANN.§604-A :1 (Supp. 1967).

